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NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES IN THE 
1950'st 
Gary Peller* 
Is it alternatively defensible to make the measure of va-
lidity of legislation the way it is interpreted by those who 
are affected by it? In the context of a charge that segre-
gation with equal facilities is a denial of equality, is 
there not a point in Plessy in the statement that if "en-
forced separation stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority" it is solely because its members choose "to 
put that construction upon it"? Does enforced separation 
of the sexes discriminate against females merely because 
it may be the females who resent it and it is imposed by 
judgments predominantly male?1 
In his widely celebrated article, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, Herbert Wechsler set forth the analytic 
structure that, with refinement, has defined the centrist position 
in constitutional law for some three decades. Reflecting the 
"process theory" perspective, he focused attention on whether 
the Supreme Court utilized the proper institutional procedures 
for decision making, defined by Wechsler as reasoning by "neu-
tral principles." His basic theme was that, because the judiciary 
is not elected, it should not upset value choices made by the 
democratically elected legislature. Unless the Court could justify 
its decisions according to reasons that are neutral to competing 
groups and interests, it must defer to legislative choice. Any 
other course would render the Court no more than a "naked 
power organ. "2 
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561 
562 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:4 
After setting forth this general theory, Wechsler offered exam-
ples from Supreme Court decisions to show how it would be ap-
plied. The passage I have quoted is the culmination of Wechs-
ler's argument that Brown v. Board of Education3 and other 
decisions outlawing racial segregation were illegitimate because 
the controversy lacked a "principled" resolution. According to 
Wechsler, the ultimate issue involved the freedom of association, 
but there was no neutral way to choose in Brown between the 
freedom to associate interracially and the freedom not to associ-
ate interracially. The case presented a fundamental value choice, 
and therefore its resolution was beyond the institutional compe-
tence of the Court. 
I am interested in how this way of thinking about constitu-
tional law, if not the particular analysis of Brown, managed to 
become the dominant approach for mainstream analysis. In the 
context of the racial and sexual domination that marked every-
day life in the United States in the 1950's, how could Wechsler, 
an eminent and sophisticated lawyer and scholar, find it plausi-
ble to think that, assuming "equal facilities," any inequality 
flowing from the "enforced separation" of American racial 
apartheid might be "solely" in the minds of blacks who "choose" 
to " 'put that construction upon it,' " or that the inequality of 
gender roles was not manifest in "females who resent it"? From 
what perspective could it seem coherent to assume that racial 
segregation in public schools was not part of a broad structure of 
social inequality? In what conception of the world was the dis-
tribution of wealth, jobs, political power, intellectual prestige, 
educational opportunity, housing, and social status that contin-
ues to reflect the objective face of institutionalized American ra-
cism irrelevant to the question of equality in public education? 
I want to try to reimagine the contours of the intellectual cul-
ture within which Wechsler's arguments could seem persuasive, 
or even plausible. There are, at the outset, a couple of factors 
that make this task challenging. First, most of us trained in law 
since the 1960's find it difficult to conceive of the basis for the 
purportedly "principled" concern about Brown voiced by 
Wechsler and other fifties legal scholars. Even if we doubted 
whether reality matched the rhetoric, the Brown decision was 
presented to us not simply as a fact of equal protection doctrine, 
but, beyond that, as a key symbol of the open and democratic 
character of American society, as evidence of the ability of law 
to respond to legitimate claims for freedom and liberty and to 
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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restrain the worst forms of social domination and oppression. 
Against this contemporary backdrop, Wechsler's concern with 
the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court seems hollow 
and abstract, hard to distinguish from the "principled" commit-
ment to "states' rights" claimed by the most vociferous and ra-
cist southern opponents of the Warren Court reforms. And in 
our cultural context, Wechsler's support of the constitutional le-
gitimacy of racial segregation in public schools by reference to 
the "obviously" benign and uncontroversial character of gender 
segregation seems to undermine his position rather than to jus-
tify it. 
But it is not only the hindsight of a transformed social context 
that makes Wechsler's decision to oppose Brown hard to grasp. 
The second important factor is that, in terms of the American 
intellectual discourse of the 1950's, Wechsler was part of a com-
munity of white, male legal scholars who actually represented a 
liberal and progressive force in academia. My guess is that 
Wechsler and other mainstream scholars in the 1950's voted for 
Adlai Stevenson against Eisenhower, opposed McCarthyism, had 
fought for and defended the New Deal against right-wing tradi-
tionalists, were outraged by the idea of racial segregation, and 
generally saw themselves as forward-thinking and open-minded. 
Yet Wechsler posed the issue of the constitutionality of school 
segregation in this remarkable way. Speaking the rhetoric of in-
stitutional legitimacy, a significant number of northeastern, 
white, liberal lawyers joined with white, southern, never-say-die 
segregationists in questioning the Court's authority and legiti-
macy in Brown. The point of departure for this Essay is the task 
of understanding how this paradoxical coalition came about. 
The simplest explanation of how Wechsler and other fifties le-
gal scholars could have perceived themselves as liberal and toler-
ant and yet have found Brown so controversial is that, for them, 
Brown symbolized the Supreme Court engaged in "value-imposi-
tion," the polar opposite of deciding by "neutral principles." In 
this account, the danger of "value-imposition" framed their un-
derstanding of constitutional law because of the way that they 
interpreted and identified the evils of the Lochner" era of consti-
tutional jurisprudence. As they saw it, the problem in the lib-
erty-of-contract cases was that the Court imposed its own politi-
cal preferences for laissez-faire economic policies in its 
4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down state statute limiting 
work hours of bakery employees as violating the liberty of contract guaranteed by the 
due process clause). 
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interpretation of the Constitution. If the "counter-majoritarian 
difficulty"6 rendered illegitimate the Lochner Court's choice of 
the free market over economic regulation, it was also implicated 
in the Brown Court's preference for integration over segregation. 
In doctrinal terms, if the legislature had the constitutional au-
thority to pass economic social welfare legislation, it must also 
have had the authority to enact other kinds of social welfare leg-
islation, including regulation of the association between races. If 
we take Wechsler at his word, he felt the pain of segregation and 
personally supported integration. 6 But standing for democracy 
meant not being result-oriented when applying the criteria for 
distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate exercises of the power 
of judicial review. The opposition to Lochner demanded opposi-
tion to Brown as a matter of integrity and principle. Through 
the trajectory of "judicial activism," progressive defenders of the 
New Deal became the conservative opponents of the Warren 
Court. 
This standard account of why Brown was controversial to 
mainstream fifties lawyers makes some sense. It seems clear 
that, despite professed "personal" sympathies with the result, 
the Brown decision evoked fear on the part of those who had 
just struggled against the conservative legal establishment over 
· the constitutional legitimacy of the New Deal, that the Court 
might exercise judicial review in reactionary ways. But this in-
terpretation still doesn't really explain the particular manner in 
which Wechsler and others perceived the critical issues. 
First of all, there is an obvious paradox here: Wechsler ex-
pressed concern that the Court would overstep its institutional 
bounds and interfere with the legislature in the context of a case 
presenting one facet of racial apartheid, an institutionalized 
form of broad-scale social domination. But Wechsler never ad-
dressed the possibility that the public school segregation at issue 
in Brown, and the general lack of voting rights for blacks, might 
at least implicitly impugn the democratic character of the legis-
lature itself. As a result, Wechsler never addressed the possibil-
ity that the "neutral principles" boundaries of judicial review, 
derived from the desire not to interfere with democratic decision 
making, rested on a substantive judgment about the democratic 
5. This phrase was first used by Alexander Bickel. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH 16 (1962). 
6. "In the days when I was joined with Charles H. Houston in a litigation in the 
Supreme Court, before the present building was constructed, he did not suffer more than 
I in knowing that we had to go to Union Station to lunch together during the recess." 
Wechsler, supra note 1, at 34. 
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character of social life. Understanding why this possibility did 
not occur to Wechsler requires a fuller consideration of the dom-
inant intellectual discourse of the fifties than the simple refer-
ence to the perceived dangers of "Lochnerizing" permits. 
In addition, there was no analytic necessity that Lochner itself 
be interpreted in institutional terms, as a judicial encroachment 
on the legislative prerogative to choose among competing eco-
nomic policies. There was plenty of legal realist scholarship 
available on which to rest substantive objections to the Lochner 
approach-namely, that the Lochner Court's rhetoric that it was 
protecting a free market of individual liberty was a sham be-
cause market power was inevitably socially produced, in part by 
the very rules of contract, property, and tort that were supposed 
to provide merely a neutral framework for transactions. Seeing 
Brown and Lochner as presenting similar issues of institutional 
legitimacy meant having already chosen the institutional focus 
. as the critical organizing category for constitutional scholarship. 
It meant having already identified "judicial activism" as the 
main flaw of Lochner, rather than, say, the injustice and inco-
herence of associating "liberty" with the "free market" of work-
ing life in the United States at the turn of the century. To un-
derstand how Wechsler_ could believe that the most important 
principles of the rule of law demanded that racial segregation be 
constitutionally upheld, we need to consider the more general 
way that the fifties legal scholars perceived and categorized the 
world so that the issues presented in Lochner and Brown 
seemed to them naturally (read nonideologically) grouped 
around the common theme of "the counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty" and the common focus on institutional legitimacy. 
In this Essay, I explore the intellectual setting within which 
Wechsler believed that defending freedom also required defend-
ing the legality of racial domination. I argue that the key to un-
derstanding this apparent paradox is to grasp the ideological/ 
cultural complex of the 1950's within which mainstream Ameri-
can intellectuals in law and in other disciplines came to terms 
with the disintegration of the traditional, "old order" paradigms 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by means of 
an intense and overriding distinction between controversial is-
sues of values and noncontroversial questions of framework and 
structure within which substantive conflict would take place. On 
that distinction rested their conviction that their own work, and 
intellectual work generally, transcended ideology and politics. 
But this context cannot alone explain the positions that 
Wechsler and other fifties scholars took. Wechsler was not sim-
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ply a product of his time, somehow trapped within the concep-
tual apparatus of post-War thought patterns. There are always 
choices made in scholarship, choices that can't be reduced to the 
impact of social forces, cultural context, or the logic of concep-
tual development. I will show that there was no analytic or his-
torical necessity that the fifties scholars view law in the particu-
lar way that they did. And even within the categories of the 
fifties discourse, there was always enough indeterminacy so that, 
if only intellectual coherence was at stake, Wechsler could have 
come to the exact opposite conclusion on any particular issue, 
including Brown. 
I believe that the sense of myopia and repressiveness we get 
when we read the passage that opens this essay is not merely a 
result of the march of time and the progress of our cultural en-
lightenment. There was something deeply conservative about 
Neutral Principles when it was written. And there was some-
thing deeply conservative about the proceduralist paradigms 
around which mainstream American intellectuals in the 1950's 
coalesced, regardless of how liberal and tolerant their rhetoric 
might have sounded then (or now). The ethnocentrism reflected 
in Wechsler's suggestion that black and female victims of social 
domination might simply "choose" to see it that way was imbed-
ded in the ways that Wechsler and other (white and male) fifties 
intellectuals more generally perceived and understood their so-
cial world. There is no way to separate these assumptions from 
their "intellectual" theories about constitutional law, adminis-
trative agencies, or the appropriate boundaries of federal/state 
relations. To understand Neutral Principles, it is necessary to 
understand how the legal thought of the fifties was constructed 
on the basis of a fundamentally apologetic social ideology. 
I. THE CENTRAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROCESS AND 
SUBSTANCE 
To account for the way that Wechsler and other white legal 
scholars interpreted the world so that it made sense simultane-
ously to perceive themselves as liberal and tolerant and yet to 
find problematic legal judgments that purported to dismantle 
racial apartheid, it is necessary to locate Neutral Principles 
within the wider setting of 1950's mainstream legal discourse. 
Wechsler's work should be seen as part of the intellectual pro-
ject undertaken by the first generation of post-War schol-
ars-including Felix Frankfurter, Henry Hart, Alexander Bickel, 
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Lon Fuller, Albert Sacks, and Harry Wellington-who together 
constructed the "legal process" approach to law, changing the 
focus for critical evaluation from the substance to the process of 
decision making. 7 
The fifties lawyers came on the scene in the midst of a rupture 
between old-line liberty-of-contract traditionalists and the legal 
realists. The traditionalists still viewed law in the formal Willis-
tonian imagery, as a set of neutral, abstract background princi-
ples facilitating the free choice of individuals in their private, 
market sphere. The legal realists asserted that the abstract prin-
ciples were indeterminate, and that policy judgment was inevita-
bly necessary in order to determine the actual application of any 
of the principles. 
The central jurisprudential project of the fifties thinkers was 
to incorporate legal realist intellectual sophistication into the 
mainstream of American legal discourse while avoiding the most 
corrosive aspect of the realist message-that there was no ana-
lytically defensible way to distinguish law from politics. Their 
intellectual strategy had two basic dimensions: first, they ac-
knowledged the realist point that there was no neutral, determi-
nate basis for deciding the social issues arising in cases; second, 
the fifties writers immediately domesticated this concession by 
limiting its application to the realm of "substance." At the level 
of "process," however, neutral, apolitical, reasoned-that is, le-
gal-discourse was still possible (hence the name "process 
theory"). 
The result of their efforts was an incredibly elegant and sym-
metrical model of legal legitimation that seemed to transcend 
the fighting issues of the thirties and the forties. The process 
approach seemed to show how a commitment to democratic 
principles was consistent with the power of common-law judges 
and administrative agency officials to make law. It appeared to 
reflect realist sophistication about the inevitability of policy 
7. My description of process theory has benefitted from previous work that has iden-
tified this approach as a unique, definable jurisprudential approach. See G. WHITE, THE 
AMERICAN Jumc1AL TRADITION 230-96 (1978); I have written about process theory in the 
context of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas 
Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982). See also Deutsch, Neutrality, 
Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Same Intersections Between Law and Political 
Science, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 169 (1968); Eskridge & Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and 
Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 PrIT. L. REv. 691 (1987); Weisberg, The 
Calebresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 
(1983). My treatment of process theory at the constitutional level has been especially 
influenced by Richard Parker. See Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its 
Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981). 
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judgments while nevertheless distinguishing law from politics. 
And it provided a way to conceive of the administration of the 
welfare state within the parameters of a general theory of law. It 
was, in short, the last great attempt at a grand synthesis of law 
in all its institutional manifestations. Tying together process 
theory in each of its institutional analyses was the view of law 
articulated by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks as the "principle of 
institutional settlement." 
A. The Principle of Institutional Settlement 
[T]he central idea of law ... [is] the principle of institu-
tional settlement. . . . [W]hen the principle . . . is 
plainly applicable, we say that the law "is" thus and so, 
and brush aside further discussion of what it "ought" to 
be. Yet the "is" is not really an "is" but a special kind of 
decision of "ought" -a statement that . . . a decision 
which is the duly arrived at result of a duly established 
procedure for making decisions of that kind "ought" to 
be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and 
until it is duly changed. 8 
The late-fifties editions of leading law reviews are filled with 
an amazing number of articles on jurisdiction, standing, ripe-
ness, mootness, choice of law, federal/state comity, and proce-
dural issues generally. It is as if the table of contents of Hart 
and W echsler's Federal Courts casebook9 suddenly became the 
intellectual agenda for a whole generation of legal scholars. At 
first glance, it is puzzling why so many scholars who professed 
concern about justice and fairness in society, and who were by 
and large liberal reformist in their political outlook, spent so 
much time and effort on these apparently technical and proce-
dural questions that today seem far removed from the substan-
tive social issues of their time-issues, say, of racial oppression, 
or the concentration of corporate power, or the post-War institu-
tionalization of the ideology and material reality of the patriar-
chal nuclear family. 
This focus on jurisdiction and procedure is explicable in terms 
of a new conception of law and the legitimate boundaries of legal 
8. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (tent. ed. 1958). 
9. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953). 
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discourse, an organizing agenda that marks the unity of fifties 
legal consciousness and the unique contribution that fifties 
thinkers made to jurisprudential study. This new outlook ani-
mates the "principle of institutional settlement" as articulated 
by Hart and Sacks, and the Hart and Wechsler Federal Courts 
casebook was (and still is) the paradigm for this legal approach. 
The general idea was that legal analysis did not depend on a 
choice between competing substantive visions of the content of 
law, and that legal theory no longer need be seen as presenting 
fundamental alternatives of a positivist or normative view of le-
gitimacy. Thus, there would be nothing particularly "legal" at 
stake in the determination of whether negligence or strict liabil-
ity would be the standard for evaluating product liability in tort, 
of whether the appropriate conception of contract would encom-
pass reliance interests or promissory estoppel theory, or of 
whether the essential form of the "rule of law" was a formally 
realizable rule or an instrumental standard, a principle or a 
policy. 
The legitimacy of law would not turn on the resolution of 
these kinds of questions, because they concerned merely the 
content of legal doctrine. Instead, as the principle of institu-
tional settlement suggests, the fifties legal scholars believed that 
it was possible to distinguish legitimate and illegitimate exer-
cises of official power while simultaneously transcending the cen-
turies-old debate between positivism and natural law, between 
the "is" and the "ought" of legal criticism, through the adoption 
of a new perspective, one that focused attention on the question 
whether a particular decision was the "duly arrived at result" of 
"duly established procedures" for resolving disputes of that 
kind. The attention to jurisdiction, standing, mootness, federal-
ism, and the like flowed from a commitment to the idea that 
these issues were the core concern of legal legitimacy because 
they were the ways to determine whether "duly established pro-
cedures" had been observed. 
The fifties writers rejected traditional legal positivism out of a 
conviction that legitimate and illegitimate exercises of power 
could be distinguished by something more meaningful than a 
genealogy leading to a sovereign; "the 'is' is not really an 'is' but 
a special kind of decision of 'ought.'" And they rejected tradi-
tional normative theories of justice with the idea that this legiti-
mation could not occur by comparing the content of legal deci-
sions to the content of independently derived theories of justice. 
The "ought" that distinguished process theorists from positivists 
was not a full-blown natural law, but a "special kind of decision 
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of 'ought' "-a determination not that a particular exercise of 
power was "right" in any normative sense, but rather that the 
appropriate institution had used the procedures that made that 
institution appropriate for deciding the kind of issue it had 
decided. 
This turn in the approach to legal legitimacy placed a whole 
new set of topics at the center of scholarly inquiry. Suddenly, 
the Erie10 case in particular and choice of law issues in general 
would command the attention of the most "rigorous" legal schol-
arship. The choice of law doctrine represented in paradigm form 
the central questions of law generally-not whether one jurisdic-
tion's rules or another should be chosen because they were sub-
stantively superior, but rather which laws should govern because 
the grid for the distribution of institutional decision-making 
power made one jurisdiction rather than the other the proper 
forum to resolve the issue. 
Henry Hart's celebrated dialogue on the power of Congress to 
curtail federal court jurisdiction11 was an exemplar of legal rea-
soning for the fifties generation because the most important is-
sues of legal legitimacy concerned the relationships between de-
cision-making institutions-relationships between courts and 
legislatures, courts and administrative agencies, the sphere of 
private ordering and regulatory agencies, state courts and fed-
eral courts, etc. Thus, the critical focus of a truly "legal" analy-
sis came down to the question "who decides?"-which institu-
tion's determination would govern in case of conflict. The 
principled analysis of this issue would then yield the "special 
kind of 'ought' " that was supposed to distinguish the rule of law 
from the mere application of force while simultaneously preserv-
ing the traditional distinction between law and politics. Proce-
dural and jurisdictional legitimacy could be neutrally and apolit-
ically determined, even if substantive legitimacy could not. To 
the extent that the boundaries of scholarship were themselves 
defined by the norms of neutrality and objectivity, a focus on 
issues of procedural legitimacy would address the particularly 
"legal" aspects of dispute resolution in a particularly "scholarly" 
way. 
The proceduralist focus provided the basis for a uniquely "le-
gal" form of ethical criticism flowing from the terms of the 
"principle of institutional settlement." The Harvard Law Re-
10. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
11. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953). 
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view Forewords of the late fifties and early sixties reflected this 
critical bite of the process discourse.12 The Supreme Court was 
continually chastised, not for the content of decision making, 
but for the procedures: per curiam decisions were illegitimate 
because they failed to reflect the "duly established procedures" 
of judicial decision making, the "reasoned elaboration" of pre-
existing principles, purposes, and policies through published 
opinions. Even Nazi law was found illegitimate, not for its vi-
cious content, but for the failure to follow the procedural norms 
of notice and individual adjudication that were contained within 
the "principle of institutional settlement," transformed by Lon 
Fuller into the "inner morality of law."13 
The process-oriented scholarship consisted of various analyses 
of institutional procedures and interrelationships, informed by 
the underlying assumptions of the "principle of institutional set-
tlement" that, once their work was completed, the legal scholars 
would have identified an encompassing calculus of institutional 
procedures and then matched them with a corresponding typol-
ogy of social issues so that each social dispute would receive the 
appropriate dispute-resolution process. Wechsler helped com-
plete the institutional competence calculus by working out its 
implications in constitutional law. Because the process approach 
made the legislature, by virtue of its democratic character, the 
ultimate authority over lawmaking by other institutions-courts, 
administrative agencies, and private parties-working out a the-
ory of judicial review was pivotal to the completion of a system-
atic, process-oriented theory of American law. 
If professional acceptance is the criterion, the fifties writers 
were incredibly successful. For nearly two decades, the process 
approach went virtually unchallenged in the world of legal schol-
arship. The premises of process theory became the background 
assumptions for a whole generation of scholars who believed the 
basic message that it was possible to talk about legal issues in 
neutral, apolitical ways, and that ideology was outside the realm 
of their legal discourse. And even today, when it is clear that any 
consensus that might have once existed as to the appropriate 
framework for legal theory has disintegrated, the process ap-
proach continues to form the background assumptions for most 
12. See, e.g., Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77 (1958); Hart, 
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959); Kurland, Fore-
word: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of 
the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143 (1964); McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportion-
ment Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 54 (1962); Sacks, Foreword, 68 HARV. L. REv. 96 (1954). 
13. L. FULLER. THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). 
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centrist legal scholars who take the institutional focus of process 
theory as their starting point. 
Within the belief structure symbolized by the "principle of in-
stitutional settlement," we can begin to make sense out of the 
focus by Wechsler and other fifties scholars on issues of institu-
tional procedures rather than on substantive justice. By analyz-
ing Brown in terms of whether the Court provided "neutral 
principles," rather than in terms of whether the result was right 
as a matter of justice, morality, or politics, the fifties scholars 
assumed that they were respecting the borders between law and 
politics on the one hand, and scholarship and advocacy on the 
other. Even those scholars who disagreed with Wechsler's con-
clusion that Brown was unprincipled tended to accept without 
question Wechsler's terms of argument within which the deci-
sion was deemed illegitimate unless it was supported by a neu-
tral, impersonal, and essentially ahistorical reasoning process. 
Through the process/substance distinction, as reflected in the 
"principle of institutional settlement," what really mattered to 
the legitimacy of an institutional judgment was precisely 
whether appropriate procedures were followed, not whether the 
right result was achieved. The refusal to allow one's personal 
preferences to sway one's professional judgment meant focusing 
on process rather than substance and not being result-oriented 
with respect to scholarly criticism. 
But the commitment to this kind of proceduralism itself re-
quires explanation. If I have accurately described the centrality 
of the process/substance distinction for mainstream legal schol-
ars, the next issue is why the distinction was so appealing in the 
fifties. In particular, we need to consider why the fifties thinkers 
so readily accepted the idea that substantive decision making 
was inevitably value-laden and political, and why they were so 
confident that simply changing the focus from substance to pro-
cedure would avoid issues of ideology and politics. 
B. The Roots of Process Theory: Post-War Intellectual 
Culture14 
The focus on institutional procedures rather than substantive 
results was a response to two overriding constraints that the fif-
14. This discussion of the ·intellectual background for fifties legal thought obviously 
summarizes and simplifies the issues. My approach, concentrating on the epistemological 
challenge of modernism and the centrality of the rise of fascism to intellectual discourse, 
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ties legal scholars would have felt: first, the deep assumption of 
the relativity of knowledge and values within which it appeared 
that any substantive vision of justice would be controversial and 
therefore outside the boundaries of legitimate legal analysis; and 
second, the need to legitimate the realm of law generally, and 
the power of courts in particular, as something nobler than the 
"raw" exercise of force. The first limitation flowed from the ba-
sic acceptance in American intellectual culture of the modernist 
critique of traditional nineteenth century social thought in the 
first decades of the twentieth century; the second was rooted in 
the challenge to the legitimacy of relativism in modernist 
thought presented by the rise of fascism in Europe. The history 
of how these two factors achieved the particular significance that 
they had in the fifties is, of course, a long story in itself. I want 
here simply to describe in broad outline form the way that 
mainstream American intellectual culture in the post-War years 
was unified around a self-image of tolerance, pluralism, and 
modernist sophistication, within which the distinction between 
process and substance could seem to play a progressive and lib-
eral role. 
1. Traditionalism, modernism, and realism- The sense of 
deadlock that legal scholars in the forties and early fifties felt 
was mirrored in other disciplines as well. The split between legal 
realists and legal traditionalists was merely one facet of a 
broader rupture in American intellectual culture between two 
fundamentally opposed visions of the nature of knowledge, 
truth, and society. Similar controversies had occurred in philoso-
phy, economics, psychology, political theory, anthropology, and 
sociology since the twenties, although at different particular 
times and with a somewhat different spin according to the inter-
nal rhetoric of the discipline. Within each field, there was one 
group of scholars identified as traditionalists who generally fol-
lowed the nineteenth-century methodology, and who were confi-
dent about the ability of reason to provide objective and univer-
sal knowledge about the world. Posed against the traditionalists 
were modernists who criticized the "metaphysics" of the tradi-
tionalists and offered instead a science "relative to consequences 
rather than antecedents. m& 
Some idea of the depth of the assault on traditional intellec-
tual categories implied by the new modernist paradigms can be 
has been influenced by the excellent discussion in E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMO-
CRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973). 
15. Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 26 (1924). 
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gained from considering the changes within the field of philoso-
phy. Throughout the nineteenth century, epistemology had al-
ways been the foundational discipline of Anglo-American intel-
lectual categories. The basic idea was that philosophy was, in 
general, the ground of all other knowledge because, in the tradi-
tion dating hack to Plato and Aristotle, it had always provided 
the tests to distinguish true knowledge from false, reality from 
illusion, reason from will, the universal from the merely contin-
gent. Epistemology, the study of knowledge, was then, in turn, 
the foundational discipline for philosophy and for the great syn-
thetic theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 
procedure was to start from some uncontroversial truth (the par-
adigm here is "I think therefore I am," or "man is by nature 
rational and· selfish"), and then through the rationalist tools of 
analysis and synthesis to build from the basic truth up to a 
grand theory in whatever discipline one was working. This kind 
of large-scale theory, derived independent of the historical con-
tingency of time and place, could then become an objective, uni-
versal truth, applying regardless of time and place, regardless of 
context. Flowing from the faith in the ability of a rationalist 
epistemology to distinguish truth from falsehood, an entire, inte-
grated body of knowledge about society, ethics, government, and 
economics could be developed in and grouped into the category 
"political economy." 
The modernist vision16 contrasted sharply with this picture of 
the organization of knowledge. The challenge to the traditional-
ists was, in a sense, completely symbolized by the creation of a 
new field of study, the sociology of knowledge. The very possibil-
ity of conducting a sociology of knowledge implied that episte-
mology could not be a foundational discipline for distinguishing 
true knowledge from falsity because what one took as knowledge 
was itself contingent and contextual, a derivative function of the 
social group in which one found oneself. Beliefs in the ultimate 
nature or value of things were not products of a rational episte-
mology, but instead were historically contingent and socially 
conditioned. And it was not just sociology that showed the con-
16. The rise of what I am calling "modernism" is associated with various social and 
political changes in the West in the 20th century. This is not an account of the causes of 
the challenge to traditionalist paradigms, nor an explanation of why the attack took the 
particular form that it did. I am simply trying to set the terms of the intellectual dis-
course within which the fifties thinkers in law found themselves situated. In particular, I 
am not suggesting that the content of the intellectual ideas themselves demanded a par-
ticular stance with respect to the social issues of their time; in fact, I believe the 
opposite. 
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tingency of belief. The rise of the social science paradigm in 
both anthropology and psychology seemed to confirm the rela-
tivistic premises of the sociology of knowledge. The very idea 
that one could construct a sociology of knowledge and a compar-
ative anthropology of belief structure suggested a radical reor-
dering of intellectual priorities. Epistemology, the study of 
knowledge, had to be subsidiary to the study of the society 
which produced that knowledge, rather than the other way 
around. Understanding the realm of the category "knowledge" 
meant first understanding how what was called knowledge func-
tioned in a concrete social context in which particular assertions 
were taken as true and others as false. It meant understanding 
the contingency of tests of truth throughout history and accord-
ing to different kinds of social experience. 
Within American philosophy, the modernist position was 
presented as pragmatism-the renunciation of the epistemologi-
cal project of rationalist philosophy in favor of a practical, func-
tional inquiry. The pragmatists focused their critique on what 
they saw as the inherent formalism and essentialism of the tra-
ditionalist "metaphysics." The belief that there was something 
in the world, "truth," that could be identified in its essence 
through the process of contemplative reflection, then used to 
distinguish knowledge from myth, was itself a form of mythol-
ogy. In its place, the pragmatists asserted a pluralist and instru-
mental vision of a lower-case truth that was contextual and rela-
tive rather than universal and absolute. Just as the sociology of 
knowledge contextualized truth to social relations, so within phi-
losophy the pragmatists contextualized truth to social interest. 
Epistemology was no longer the grounding, foundational disci-
pline that would gatekeep at the boundaries of truth and falsity 
because truth and falsity were not absolute, essential concepts. 
Instead, truth was subordinate to the question of function. The 
possible truth of a hypothesis had to be tested to see how useful 
it was in explaining things and to determine what its conse-
quences were in the world of experience. There was no purpose 
in abstract musings about universalized concepts like Truth or 
Knowledge. All that led to was a complementary set of rational 
concepts capturing the metaphysical, otherworldly "true es-
sence" of things but having nothing to do with reality-a formal, 
logical, and useless system of internally coherent thought.17 
17. See, e.g., J. DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY (1920); w. JAMES, THE MEAN-
ING OF TRUTH (1909); W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1907). 
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The critique of the traditionalists generally followed this "an-
tiformalist" or "antimetaphysical" rhetoric in the various fields. 
The traditionalists were characterized as something like neo-
Aristotelean essentialists by modernists who placed context 
prior to essence. The modernists saw social, historical, psycho-
logical, and cultural conditioning where the traditionalists con-
structed objective theories of ethics and grand visions of Truth 
and Justice. The study of government would be transformed 
from political economy to political science and positive econom-
ics, behaviorism was posed against the nineteenth-century ra-
tionalistic psychology, ethics and epistemology were subsidiary 
to sociology and anthropology, and the method of rationalist re-
flection was challenged by the method of empirical observation. 
Within legal thought, the legal realists made the modernist 
critique. In legal discourse, the traditionalist nineteenth-century 
commitment to large-scale, integrated theories of society took 
the form of a unified vision of law that centered around the pub-
lic/private distinction of classical liberal political thought. Ac-
cording to the legal traditionalists, the legitimacy of contract, 
tort, and property law rested on the idea that these common-law 
doctrines were merely the neutral framework within which indi-
viduals pursued their own interests. The common-law fields to-
gether were presented as a private sphere of liberty within which 
individual legal actors were conceived to have chosen, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, whatever legal consequences would be im-
posed. This private sphere was contrasted with a public sphere, 
within which government could legitimately regulate so long as 
it legislated in the public interest. The private sphere was the 
realm of individual choice, the public sphere the realm of social 
regulation. The judiciary's role was to enforce this boundary by 
distinguishing between duress and free will within contract law, 
and by keeping the government out of the private sphere in con-
stitutional law. 
According to the traditionalist imagery, this boundary en-
forcement could proceed neutrally and apolitically because it 
followed from the essential characteristics of free choice itself. It 
was therefore legitimate, for example, that the Lochner Court 
found unconstitutional legislation limiting the workday hours in 
a bakery because such labor-reform legislation violated the pub-
lic/private line. It introduced the public power of the state into 
the private contractual choice of an employee and an employer. 
Only in cases where the common law itself would find a lack of 
free choice-that is, where the common law would find duress, 
fraud, or incompetency-could the legislature regulate. The pro-
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tection of the economic free market was neutral because the 
market was a reflection of individual freedom to choose ends, as 
determined by the neutral doctrines of the common law. Inter-
ference with the market or (and this was the same thing) with 
the common law was therefore interference with liberty itself.18 
Following the general lines of the modernist challenge in the 
broader intellectual field, the legal realists attacked the tradi-
tionalist identification of individual liberty with the doctrines of 
the common law. The critique largely centered on the demon-
stration that the principles through which the traditionalists de-
fined the realm of contract, property, and tort were analytically 
indeterminate. According to the realists, the "free market" that 
the traditionalists would protect was the result of social power, 
not private will. The purportedly neutral common-law rules 
could all be reread as particular policy choices because, for every 
rule, there was a counterrule pointing in the opposite direction; 
for every precedent, there was a different one suggesting a con-
trary resolution.19 The choice, then, of the rule or the counter-
rule was a policy choice. Each could analytically apply in any 
given case. The rules were really standards, the principles really 
policies, the "free market" really just a particular form of regu-
lation, private choices really reflections of public power, and the 
image of "a rule of law rather than men" really a sham. 
The realists argued that the traditionalists could only avoid 
the public and political implications of legal doctrine by means 
of "formalism," conceived as a kind of essentialism. Thus, the 
traditionalist protection of the "liberty of contract" depended on 
a particular metaphysical belief that "contract" and "free will" 
were real things in the world that could be neutrally and apoliti-
18. This is a general summary of the dominant late 19th-century mode of legal con-
sciousness. To be sure, not all common-law doctrines were constitutionalized in the way 
that the text suggests. The logic of the public/private conceptual apparatus was never 
fully extended. For a fuller discussion of this view of the late 19th-century legal thought, 
see Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 
1728-31, 1754-56 (1976); Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Con-
sciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3, 3 RES. LAW & 
Soc. 3, 7-14 (1980); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 
1193-1219 (1985). Gordon, Legal Thought and Practice in the Age of American Enter-
prise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA (G. Geison 
ed. 1983); Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book Review), 76 CALIF. L. REv. 465, 477-82 
(1988). 
19. The classic realist casebook was organized according to the rule/counterrule 
structure itself. See F. KESSLER, & M. SHARP, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1953). 
Powerful examples of realist crit_ique of the neutrality of precedential and rule-based 
argument are K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND !Ts STUDY 
73-76 (1930); Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L. J. 201 (1931). 
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cally identified because they had certain essential characteris-
tics. The application of the common-law doctrines of compe-
tency, duress, fraud, and consideration were supposed to answer 
neutrally the question of free will because, according to the real-
ists, the traditionalists believed that the common-law categories 
transcendentally matched up with distinctions that existed in 
the world itself. The traditionalists, in short, engaged in "tran-
scendental nonsense. "20 
Just as the modernist tradition represented by the sociology of 
knowledge contextualized knowledge to social relations, and just 
as pragmatic philosophy took truth as contextual to social pur-
pose, so the realists fundamentally challenged the traditionalists 
by placing their vision of the freely contracting individual in the 
context of a legally influenced social context. The private, indi-
vidual free will that was supposed to characterize the consent to 
contract actually was exercised within the context of a public, 
social distribution of wealth. The terms at which one would 
agree to a contractual exchange were influenced by the bargain-
ing power one had. And the bargaining power one had, was in 
turn, a function of the legal rules relating to the distribution of 
property and entitlements, a distribution that could not itself be 
referred back to any ground in individual will. The traditional-
ists' notion that law could be understood according to an inte-
grated, unified perspective centering around the public/private 
distinction was a sham because the private realm that was sup-
posed to provide the ground for the approach was itself an effect 
of public power.21 
According to the realist critique, the traditionalist image that 
law enforced preexisting private rights was circular. The rights 
were themselves a result of the legal decision to protect the free-
dom of one party at the expense of the security of the other. 
Legal decisions could not be based on rights because rights were 
the result of the determination of where to draw the particular 
line between the conflicting rhetoric of freedom to act and secur-
ity from injury. The supposedly neutral and facilitative com-
mon-law doctrines were actually particular decisions of public 
policy and specific exercises of social power. Private consent oc-
curred within this context of publicly determined bargaining 
20. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 809 (1935); see also K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 19, at 69. 
21. See, e.g., Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 603 
(1943); Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 PoL. 
Sci. Q. 470 (1923); F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, supra note 19. See generally Peller, supra 
note 18, at 1233-40; Singer, supra note 18, at 482-502. 
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power. What to characterize as free will instead of duress was 
itself a policy decision about how to regulate the economic field. 
The traditionalists' principles could not be applied except 
through the sub rosa mediation of policy judgments, because 
none of the abstract principles had any necessary, essential cor-
relates in particular doctrinal rules. 
The realist antidote to the "metaphysics" of the traditionalists 
was, like the modernist movement in other fields, a heavy dose 
of behavioralism and functionalism. Thus, "law" could not be 
identified in any a priori way, through any essentialist concept 
of its true meaning. Instead, it could only be observed in action, 
in seeing how officials actually responded to disputes. The value 
of a legal decision could not be determined by a rationalistic test 
of conceptual coherence, but instead depended on how the rule 
functioned in practice, on its social consequences.22 
Like the rupture between traditionalists and modernists in the 
more general intellectual culture, the opposition between the 
realists and the traditionalists proceeded within polar terms of 
argument that appeared to reflect a threshold impasse between 
two diametrically conflicting views of law and social life: where 
the traditionalists saw rules, the realists saw standards. Where 
the traditionalists saw private choice, the realists saw public 
power. The traditionalist conviction that law consisted of neu-
tral, background principles was challenged by the realist demon-
stration that the law was rooted in social policy. The traditional-
ist dedication to essential form was opposed by the realist focus 
on observable function. The traditionalist invocation of law as 
protecting private rights was challenged by the realist vision of 
law as distributing public power. 
2. The symbolic role of fascism- The rise of fascism in Eu-
rope interrupted this struggle over intellectual premises between 
the traditionalists and the modernists and gave it a new, height-
ened, and dramatic urgency. American intellectuals began to feel 
that something beyond theoretical posturing was at stake, that 
the intellectual conflict had real-world implications in the imme-
diately pressing context of broad social repression by the Nazis. 
The debate between traditionalists and modernists soon re-
flected an overriding preoccupation with the question of which 
stance was better poised to oppose the fascist challenge. The 
22. See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 12-42 (1933); J. FRANK, LAW 
AND THE MODERN MIND 121-32, 148-59, 264-84 (6th ed. 1949); Cook, Scientific Method 
and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303 (1927); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 
457, 461 (1897). 
580 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:4 
manner in which this debate was resolved, and the way that 
American intellectuals diagnosed the ideological causes of au-
thoritarianism, constitute a critical turning point in the con-
struction of the self-identity of mainstream American intellectu-
als. John Dewey's pragmatic compromise between the 
traditionalist conviction that moral authority depended on belief 
in the objectivity of truth and ethics and the modernist assertion 
that such issues were necessarily contextual and relative became, 
by the fifties, the broad filter through which the first generation 
of post-War intellectuals in America would understand both 
their roles as intellectuals and the general legitimacy of Ameri-
can society. 
The normative basis for opposition to fascism posed a particu-
lar ideological dilemma for pragmatic and social-science-minded 
modernists in intellectual life generally, and for realists in law 
particularly. In the political context of the pre-War period, the 
modernist assumptions of the social construction of knowledge 
and belief had always been associated with the politically liberal 
and progressive symbolism of social welfare ideology. But the 
rise of fascism led to charges that linked the modernist mindset 
with isolationist politics. If value and justice were truly relative, 
and concepts like right and wrong simply the products of cul-
ture, then from what vantage point could modernists condemn 
the Nazis? If the pragmatic test of truth were accepted, then 
was Italian fascism to be judged favorably because it pragmati-
cally "worked," i.e., the trains ran on time? What good was a 
philosophy that said truth depended on what "works" in the 
world, but then couldn't take any position on the issue how 
"works" would be defined? If human behavior was scientifically 
predictable according to social conditioning, then why couldn't 
the formation of tastes, ends, and values all be scientifically 
molded for the best social world? At what point could social sci-
ence stop short of its totalitarian implications? And if, as the 
realists suggested, there were no moral or ethical absolutes with 
which to evaluate law, if law was simply "the prophecies of what 
the courts will do in fact,"23 as Holmes asserted, then the realists 
were actually saying that law is whatever those in power say it 
is, that might makes right.u 
In the interstices of traditionalist polemics against modernism 
was the implicit charge that the rhetoric of the science of society 
23. Holmes, supra note 22, at 461. 
24. See, e.g., Lucey, Jurisprudence and the Future Social Order, 16 Soc. Sci. 213 
(1941). See generally, E. PURCELL, supra note 14, at 117-96. 
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echoed the discourse of fascism itself, with its emphasis on the 
ability of technocratic science to fashion the best society and the 
master race. In the emotionally intense setting of World War II 
and the struggle against fascism, the Anglo-American tradition-
alists accused the modernists of moral vacuity in the face of the 
greatest evil that the modern world had experienced. The mod-
ernists had to answer the charge that their conception of a sci-
ence of society was fundamentally immoral because science 
could serve any master, even Nazis. 
It is important to emphasize here that, even within the con-
ceptual terms of the debate with traditionalists, the modernist 
American intellectuals had various ways available to them to un-
derstand the relationship between their theoretical commit-
ments and their political and existential opposition to fascism. 
The particular way that they articulated the evils of authoritari-
anism was not determined by the logic of their conceptual appa-
ratus, nor by any essential characteristics of fascism itself. It re-
flected, instead, a social and political choice to interpret the 
issues of their time in one particular way, to the exclusion of 
other plausible views of their social environment. 
There were, at the outset, three principal alternatives analyti-
cally available to respond to the traditionalist claim that mod-
ernism was guilty of moral relativism. One route would have 
been to continue carrying out the most radical implications of 
the modernist attack on the legitimacy of the old order by re-
flexively extending the premises of the social sciences, say of so-
ciology or anthropology, to the social sciences themselves. Here 
one could imagine the sociology of sociology, and then the sociol-
ogy of the sociology of sociology, with no stopping point. Taking 
seriously the premise of the social construction of knowledge 
would have quickly exposed the infinite regress contained within 
the methodological assumption that the social scientist could 
have objective, scientific knowledge about what a society called 
"objective, scientific knowledge." The functionalism of the social 
sciences would have begun to look like a kind of formalism 
within which certain observational categories-a kinship econ-
omy or a dispute-resolution process-took on the status of uni-
versal, essentialist functions, that is, a priori assumptions, filter-
ing the social scientist's experiences and observations. In short, 
this development from the modernist critique of the old order 
would have understood the significance of the critique to lie in 
the demonstration that the claim to authority under the mantle 
of a true knowledge, whether rationalist or of the social science 
variety, was false. Knowledge was necessarily socially con-
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structed and could always be constructed differently, and there-
fore there could be no distinction between knowledge and 
politics. 
Continuing the modernist critique would have led to critical 
reflection about the ideological functions played by the historical 
claim to knowledge and truth in the economy of social power in 
Enlightenment culture. In law, the realist critique of formalism 
and essentialism would have extended from the particular lib-
erty of contract approach to the more general ideological role 
that the claim to neutral legal decision making played in justify-
ing various forms of social power. The extension of the modern-
ist critique would have opposed fascism while remaining critical 
towards other forms of false authority claimed under the man-
tles of Reason and Science. Rather than interpreting fascism as 
the result of "irrational" nationalism, emotionalism, racism, and 
mob action, it would have emphasized the ways that the Nazis 
themselves justified their authority through the rhetoric of Sci-
ence and technocracy. 
A second possible response to the charge of moral relativism 
would have been to take the modernist positions as representing 
a new, objective vision of truth and society, an actual correction 
of the "mistakes" of the traditionalists. This alternative would 
have met the charge of ethical relativism by claiming an objec-
tive basis for the resolution of ethical questions. The modernists 
then would have turned idealism on its head by reversing the 
traditionalists' metaphors of ontology, epistemology, and causa-
tion. Rather than consciousness preceding existence, the mod-
ernist ontology would understand social existence as the ground 
of consciousness. Consciousness would be seen as relative to so-
cial relations. In psychology, economics, and political theory, the 
constituent unit of analysis would be the social institution rather 
than the individual, and the assumption would be that the indi-
vidual was, in a sense, a function of social environment rather 
than a free-standing rational unit. Indeed, this kind of compet-
ing substantive vision was implied in the empirical method it-
self, in the assumption that the facts preceded the theory rather 
than the other way around. This response would have posed 
modernists against fascism through the rhetoric of a true science 
that found in the nationalism and irrational mobs of the Nazis 
evidence of a lack of scientific objectivity and dispassion. In law, 
the reversal of the traditionalist metaphors of understanding 
would have substituted the social group for the focus on the in-
dividual, the public for the private, policy for principle, and 
function for form. The realist analytic would have been taken as 
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the basis for a social-welfare view of law that would be legiti-
mate because it would follow the model of the social sciences 
generally. 211 
The third alternative, the one chosen by the American intel-
lectual mainstream, rejected both of these options. Instead of ei-
ther continuing to contextualize claims of knowledge to social 
ideology, or offering the process of contextualization itself as the 
foundation for a substantive social theory based on the group 
and the social structure rather than the individual, the main-
stream fifties thinkers answered the criticism of relativism by 
making the fact/value distinction a foundational organizing prin-
ciple for post-War intellectual discourse. John Dewey's response 
to the charge that the modernist movement was implicated in 
the rise of authoritarianism26 shows how this turn toward a rein-
terpreted positivist analytic27 provided a new center for Ameri-
can intellectual rhetoric. His defense of pragmatism was echoed 
in the way that the modernists would be institutionalized within 
each particular field of the humanities and social sciences, in-
cluding law. 
Dewey brilliantly turned the relativist and instrumental prem-
ises of the modernists into a virtue rather than a vice. According 
to Dewey, value-relativism did not lead to condoning the fas-
cists. Quite the opposite. It was philosophical absolutism, the ar-
25. In fact, something like this generally tracked the way that the critique of idealism 
proceeded in continental intellectual life. The rise of concentration on social theory as 
the new foundational discipline, and the implication of socialism in particular, or the 
idea of the social welfare state in general, as the substantive political theory flowing from 
the modernist critique was evidence of this. The strength in Europe of Marxism, existen-
tialism, and structuralism as substantive visions defensible on grounds of the observation 
of human history and the social world is comparable. Here the idea was that all knowl-
edge was socially constructed, but that ideologies could be themselves distinguished and 
evaluated-in the Marxist tradition, false consciousness could be distinguished from 
true; in the existentialist tradition, bad faith could be distinguished from authenticity; 
and in the Freudian tradition, the true unconscious structure could be distinguished 
from the repressions and distortions of consciousness. 
26. See J. DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE (1939); see also J. DEWEY, supra note 17. 
See generally E. PURCELL, supra note 14, at 197-266. 
27. I am not suggesting that Dewey was a classic positivist in the sense that he be-
lieved in a pure realm of facts, separate and divorced from values. Rather than seeing 
facts and values as occupying two divorced realms, with the realm of facts privileged as 
objective and true, Dewey's pragmatism, as it became embedded in American intellectual 
culture, separated facts and values by making the realm of reason subsidiary to the 
realm of values. Here, in contrast to classic positivism, values were privileged as the 
frame within which facts were interpreted or gathered. Or, to put it in other terms, rea-
son was conceived as instrumental. Despite these important differences between Dewey 
and the classic positivists, I have chosen to characterize Dewey's ideology as "positivist" 
in order to emphasize the way that it preserved the centrality of the fact/value distinc-
tion even as it changed the hierarchical relationship between the terms. 
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rogance that one has the true vision of things, that supported 
the fascists' notion that they could legitimately impose their vi-
sion on others. The social science approach, the functionalist 
methodological focus, and the pragmatic epistemology all shared 
a relativism about ultimate truth and an agnosticism about 
ends. Values and ends were outside the realm of knowledge. 
They were the givens with which the pragmatic scientist would 
work, but about which the scientist could say nothing, lest objec-
tivity be compromised. 
But rather than suggest a thoroughgoing relativism, the con-
viction that values and ends were beyond the grasp of social sci-
ence actually carried within itself an intermediate kind of nor-
mative premise (something like the "special kind of decision of 
'ought'"): the commitment that an open, democratic society was 
superior to a closed, totalitarian one. The philosophical conclu-
sion that values were necessarily relative rather than absolute 
itself suggested certain truths: open and free inquiry was prefer-
able to dogmatically held or imposed belief; diversity and toler-
ance were preferable to conformity and repression; and democ-
racy was preferable to dictatorship. 
Democracy, in Dewey's imagery, was precisely the experimen-
tal, open-ended method of pragmatism and social science re-
flected in social, institutional form. The laboratory of democ-
racy, the experimental laboratory of values, would choose the 
purposes and ends to be pursued in social life. The assumption 
of relativism would mean that no particular value choices would 
ever harden into social dogma. Instead, they would always exist 
as hypotheses, to be tested according to democratic choice and 
discarded if the voters decided that they didn't work. 
The pragmatic approach made no claim to knowledge at the 
level of substantive politics. It was open to differences in goals, 
ends, and values because it was committed to free and open in-
quiry. The free society was experimental, open to different vi-
sions for social life, tolerant of the differences in the ends of dif-
ferent people, and ultimately tolerant of the differences in 
people themselves. At a deep metaphoric level, absolutism in in-
tellectual work was linked to the concept of the pure master 
race, the essential human, in fascist ideology. 
Rather than choose between the fundamentally different vi-
sions of the traditionalists and the modernists, Dewey made the 
fact/value distinction the main feature of a discursive peace 
treaty that divided up the territories of intellectual and political 
life into a realm of instrumental reason and a realm of irreduci-
ble value conflict. Rather than pose the modernist methodology 
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as an alternative substantive vision, Dewey neatly suggested that 
the modernists, in fact, had transcended substantive debate it-
self. Substantive debate occurred at the level of ends, values, 
purposes, and goals, all outside the realm of the new instrumen-
tal reason that would apply only to means, not to ends them-
selves. The distinctions between fact and value and ends and 
means would thus, in turn, provide the boundaries between 
politics and science, the social field and the intellectual one.28 
Dewey's synthesis of the relativist assumptions of modernist 
thought with an intellectual justification for opposition to au-
thoritarianism did more than simply provide a coherent re-
sponse in the ongoing debate about ethics occasioned by the rise 
of fascism. It also subdued the feeling of opposition and rupture 
between modernists and traditionalists by placing their differ-
ences within the terms of a broader consensus. The radical 
threat that the modernist paradigm initially posed in intellectual 
life was to call into question the possibility of any form of ra-
tional discourse free from the influence of social structure, of 
politics. If knowledge had no essential attributes, but instead 
was a function of contingent cultural beliefs, then intellectual 
work itself would appear to be political, deciding which forms of 
belief to privilege as truth and which to marginalize as mythol-
ogy. But Dewey's rhetoric rescued the distinction between rea-
son and politics by making the claims to reason more modest 
and subordinate. In Dewey's discourse, modernist reason was in-
strumental, but it still occupied a realm separate from mere be-
lief and opinion. 
The humanist pragmatism that Dewey advocated was more 
than a philosophical position. In the period immediately after 
the Second World War, it became the cultural framework that 
defined for mainstream American intellectuals their roles as in-
tellectuals and, more generally, their conception of the differ-
ence between freedom and domination. Within this self-under-
standing, standing for liberty and freedom against the forces of 
domination and oppression represented by fascism specifically 
meant not taking a stand on substantive issues of politics and 
28. The differences in the resolution of the critique of traditionalists between 
America and Europe would be traced to an original and historic "American exceptional-
ism" that had from the beginning reflected the attitude of pragmatic, nonideological trial 
and error; America seemed to have a deep consensus on the procedures for resolving 
disputes rather than a tie to any particular ideology. See D. BooRSTIN, THE GENIUS OF 
AMERICAN PoLmcs 1-35 (1953). America represented "the end of ideology" itself. D. 
BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF PoLmCAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTIES 
(1960). 
586 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:4 
the distribution of social power. Intellectuals would respect the 
boundary between knowledge and politics by a steadfast value-
neutrality, refusing to privilege one belief structure over an-
other. Through the interpretation that linked European fascism 
(and later communism) to philosophical absolutism, they 
imagined that the preservation of liberty and freedom depended 
on ensuring that no substantive vision of truth or justice would 
be favored. Being enlightened and "open-minded" meant not 
having an ideology. Being democratic meant encouraging plural-
ism. And being mature and realistic meant suppressing the more 
radical implications of the old order's disintegration. 
In the context of the fifties, this stance was aligned with many 
seemingly liberal and progressive positions. Intellectuals argued 
for free speech, against McCarthyism, for free and open inquiry 
in scholarly research and in public discourse, for an end to reli-
gious indoctrination in schools, for tolerance of dissent and cul-
tural nonconformity. It was legitimate to take such stands in 
their professional roles because these issues concerned the struc-
ture and procedures that made a free, pluralist society possible. 
These were the ethical absolutes that were contained within the 
notion that there were no ethical absolutes. On the other hand, 
it was a political question whether there ought to be significant 
redistribution of wealth or social power in American society, 
whether socialism or capitalism ought to reign. The commitment 
to freedom and democracy meant understanding that such ques-
tions were to be decided through open debate in the social field. 
The new consensus that defined the intellectual mainstream in 
the fifties was accordingly marked by a division between a com-
mitment to the procedural freedom symbolized by free speech 
and open inquiry and a refusal to take a stand on substantive 
social issues. 
II. THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE UNDER 
PROCESS THEORY 
A. The Confidence in Consensus 
Are the positions which have been taken thus far in 
these materials conventional and generally accepted? 
Might a representative chairman of the Republican Na-
tional Committee, for example, be expected to agree with 
them? A chairman of the Democratic National Commit-
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tee? A representative union leader? A representative 
president of the United States Chamber of Commerce? 
Of the American Bar Association? A representative mem-
ber of the Soviet Russian Politburo? A younger professor 
of anthropology in an American university representative 
of the most recent trend of thought in this field? Of eco-
nomics? History? Philosophy? Political science? Psychol-
ogy? Sociology?29 
587 
This passage appears at the end of the section of the Hart and 
Sacks Legal Process materials devoted to the "principle of insti-
tutional settlement."30 It is remarkable for the grand confidence 
it reflects in the way that the "principle of institutional settle-
ment" resolved the antinomies that had divided the several pre-
ceding generations of mainstream legal scholars. This imagery of 
consensus about the uncontroversial character of the process ap-
proach to law mirrors Dewey's confidence in his more general 
resolution of the rupture between traditionalists and modernists 
because, in terms of the new intellectual culture they helped 
construct, the process-theorists of the fifties were embarked on 
the same project as Dewey. 
Like Dewey, the fifties legal scholars were faced with the ap-
parent necessity of taking a stand on the fundamentally opposed 
visions of law and social life represented by the traditionalists 
and realists. Like Dewey, they associated the socially oriented 
modernist approach with intellectual sophistication and progres-
sive politics, but needed to find a way to answer critics who 
identified realism with moral and ethical relativity in the face of 
fascism. And like Dewey, they resolved the intellectual impasse 
by refusing to choose, instead seeming to transcend the whole 
debate through a larger, more general vision: the distinction be-
tween process and substance. Their immense confidence in the 
wide appeal of the principle of institutional settlement flowed 
from the fact that Hart and Sacks imagined that they were part 
of a great wave of historic change linked up with and confirmed 
29. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 8, at 123. 
30. Id. at 1-123. Their discussion is striking in that they pay a great deal of attention 
to methodological and epistemological issues as they had been articulated in the social 
sciences and the humanities-in the first full set of text notes the legal process student is 
informed of the basic purposes of social life (to maximize the sum total of satisfaction of 
valid human wants with a roughly acceptable distribution), the appropriate differences 
in the "nature of knowledge" between natural science and social science, and the reasons 
why Holmes's positivist image of law through a bad man's eyes was misguided. It is 
therefore no accident that in their vision of consensus they explicitly include so many 
academics from other fields. 
588 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:4 
by the transformations within other intellectual disciplines. 
They believed they accomplished for law a decisive turn in un-
derstanding, one that made the intellectual sophistication repre-
sented by a "younger professor of anthropology" reflecting "the 
most recent trend of thought in this field" consistent with a plu-
ralistic tolerance of substantive differences that extended all the 
way from mainstream Republicans to party Communists.31 
The process/substance distinction articulated in the "principle 
of institutional settlement" seemed an ingenious solution to the 
dilemma that the fifties lawyers perceived. On the one hand, the 
rise of European fascism made it imperative that the rule of law 
in "free" countries be distinguished from the rule of force in au-
thoritarian society. But, in their view, the only available sub-
stantive theory with which to distinguish law from politics was 
the traditionalist approach tying the very idea of a rule of law to 
the particular market-oriented common law doctrines reigning 
at the turn of the century. The traditionalist view of legal legiti-
macy would require the resurrection of Lochner and the repudi-
ation of the New Deal. 
Realism appeared more politically progressive and intellectu-
ally sophisticated. The realist demonstration of the inevitable 
policy dimensions of legal argument helped to legitimate the 
progressive social welfare programs of the thirties as no different 
in kind from the economic regulation implicit in the enforce-
ment of the old common law. The problem, however, was that 
the realists simultaneously impugned the law/politics distinction 
itself, just at the moment when the rule of law was being 
presented as the key difference between democratic and totali-
tarian societies. If all legal decision making was policy, then the 
characterization of judicial action as "the rule of law rather than 
men" seemed illegitimate. 
The fifties thinkers believed that, in the process approach, 
they had found a framework that could legitimate the basic 
structure of American legal institutions while transcending the 
stalemated debates between realists and traditionalists that had 
dragged on in one form or another since the thirties. They 
thought that they had created a truly pluralist and pragmatic 
discourse for critical evaluation of law, one that would at once 
reflect the intellectual sophistication of the realist debunking of 
31. In light of the fact that they were writing a coursebook, their attention to the 
social sciences is also striking, confirming the sense that they were aware of, and took 
themselves to be taking a stand on, the struggles between traditionalists and modernists 
that had divided the various fields. 
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"formalist" decision making while investing American legal in-
stitutions after the New Deal and the war against fascism with a 
legitimacy that would mark off the "free world" ruled by law 
from the "authoritarian" one ruled by will. 
The polarization of legal thought in the 1930's and 1940's had 
made it appear that some fundamental choice was necessary. 
But just as the fact/value distinction served as a territorial truce 
line in the more general intellectual conflict, so Hart and Sacks 
were sure that the process/substance distinction was the geo-
graphic foundation for a pluralist tolerance of both the tradi-
tionalist and realist visions of law. Just as Dewey had rendered 
the modernist relativism acceptable by limiting it to the priority 
of ends and values, so the fifties legal scholars made legal real-
ism acceptable by editing out its most radical implications, by 
domesticating the realist critique to the realm of substance. 
The process-theorists could then integrate a tamed realism 
back into the mainstream of legal thought. The sophistication of 
realism would be utilized to articulate the content of law and 
would be reflected in the notion that any legal question was po-
tentially open to "policy" analysis and the methodology of "bal-
ancing" interests. With respect to the judiciary in particular, 
there was an explicit concession that what courts did was often 
no more than policy-making. On the other hand, the delegiti-
mating implications of the realist work could be avoided by 
keeping realism in its place, by making ultimate questions of le-
gal legitimacy depend on a vision of process divorced from sub-
stance and thereby protected from the corrosion of realist 
critique. 
Through the distinction between process and substance, the 
fifties theorists could walk a pluralist middle ground between 
the traditionalist belief in ethical objectivity and the realist im-
plication of relativism. On the one hand, the principle of institu-
tional settlement reflected the acknowledgment that, as the real-
ists had suggested, there was no a priori, transcendental content 
to law. In terms of substance, there was only the positive fact 
that a particular decision had been made by a particular institu-
tion. The relativity of value premise of modernism would be 
taken to mean that the identification of legitimate legal deci-
sions could not turn on a substantive theory because any such 
theory would encompass value judgments. Hence the notion in 
the principle of institutional settlement that "when the principle 
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... is plainly applicable, we say that the law 'is' thus and so, 
and brush aside further discussion of what it ought to be."32 
On the other hand, the traditionalist identification of law with 
value-free neutral principles was reflected in the conviction that, 
in the realm of procedure, neutral, value-free reasoning was pos-
sible. That is, it was still possible to assert that an institutional 
decision " 'ought' to be accepted as binding. . .unless and until 
it is duly changed." While substantive decision making might ul-
timately be political, procedural analysis could be both norma-
tive and neutral. 
Once the distinction between process and substance was prop-
erly understood, no fundamental choice between what appeared 
to be the polar terms of legal debate was ·necessary because, ac-
cording to the process rhetoric, the stalemate between realists 
and traditionalists was based on a shared misconception that the 
legitimacy of law depended on its content. The process/sub-
stance distinction would transcend the whole struggle by seeing 
the critical issues of law on a "more fundamental" plane, a van-
tage point from which the battle between realists and tradition-
alists could be subsumed to the level of substance, outside the 
boundary of useful legal analysis. 
The process approach to law presented an image of pluralism 
within the content or substance of law as well-law could in-
clude both rules and standards, principles and policies, private 
decision making and social regulation, a mixed sphere of both 
individualistic and collectivist norms, both sides of the tradition-
alist and realist opposition. Rather than base the legitimacy of 
law on these substantive choices, Hart and Sacks asserted that 
the "institutionalized procedures for the settlement of questions 
of group concern" were "obviously more fundamental than the 
substantive arrangements in the structure of a society . . . since 
they are at once the source of the substantive arrangements and 
the indispensable means of making them work effectively."33 
In short, the fifties process-theorists reconceived the relation-
ship between law and politics in a way that closely mirrored the 
reconceived relationship between reason and values as articu-
lated by Dewey. Just as reason was both a source of values (in 
the sense that free and open inquiry would lead to at least provi-
sional truths) and simultaneously merely instrumental and 
subordinate (in the sense that all reasoning was necessarily situ-
ated within a framework of values and therefore was subsidiary 
32. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 8, at 4. 
33. Id. at 3. 
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to that framework), so in the Hart and Sacks conception law, 
conceived of as institutional procedures, was both the "source of 
the substantive arrangements" and, simultaneously, merely in-
strumental in the sense that law was subsidiary to politics. Insti-
tutional procedures were merely the "means" that could serve 
any content for law. Society might, for example, choose a capi-
talist, socialist, or social welfare economic policy. The proce-
dures within which such choices were made and implemented 
were conceived as both the neutral source for, but analytically 
separate from, such political decisions themselves. 
The incredibly quick acceptance of the process approach 
across the legal field reflected the sense on the part of post-War 
legal scholars that they had found a way to pull everything back 
together, that their intellectual commitments were fundamen-
tally consistent with their moral and political beliefs, so that un-
derstanding the principle of institutional settlement in law in 
turn meant being able to demonstrate what was wrong with Na-
zism (and right with America) without having to resort to neces-
sarily unprovable moral judgments. They could reject the tradi-
tionalist conception of law and yet preserve the distinction 
between law and politics necessary to their understanding of the 
difference between a regime of law and an authoritarian regime 
of imposed values. The distinction between law and politics 
would survive with law playing a subordinate role to democratic 
choice, just as, in the more general mainstream intellectual cul-
ture, the distinction between reason and values survived by 
making reason serve an instrumental role. And just as Dewey's 
articulation of a humanist pragmatism served as a generative 
moment for the unification of mainstream American intellectu-
als, so the distinction between process and substance served as a 
generative moment for the self-understanding of what would 
count as "common sense" in legal thought. 
B. The Structure of Institutional Legitimacy 
It would be useful at this point to outline the actual frame-
work for thinking about institutional decision making that the 
process-theorists utilized. I will again use the Hart and Sacks 
Legal Process materials as the main source for this description. 
While other process writers might have developed the analysis of 
particular institutions with greater sophistication, the Legal 
Process text was by far the most ambitious attempt to describe 
American law comprehensively, including all of its major institu-
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tional settings and accounting for the various permutations of 
interrelationships between institutions. In fact, the only major 
institutional relationship not treated within the comprehensive 
vision of the Legal Process was the category of judicial review of 
legislation, the subject of Wechsler's Neutral Principles and of 
the next section of this Essay. 
Hart and Sacks rested their framework for institutional analy-
sis on the starting premise of the relativity of value. First, they 
rejected the notion that the objectivity of law might be rooted in 
a substantive social theory. Hart and Sacks asserted that, while 
the realists were correct that law was a social science, the realists 
failed to understand that social science was fundamentally dif-
ferent from natural science because the "science of society"3• 
dealt with people engaged in purposeful activity. Their purposes 
could never be determinately and objectively identified and 
ranked, and thus social science involved an ethical dimension 
not involved in natural science's impersonal observation of inan-
imate objects. The methodology of law was, like all social sci-
ences, necessarily "judgmatical" and "prudential" rather than 
empirical and positivist. 35 
But the fact that substantive decision making was necessarily 
inexact and somewhat subjective did not mean that legal analy-
sis could not be ethically neutral. The ethical dimension of law 
was not substantive, but procedural. As Hart and Sacks put it, 
the very notion of law necessarily involves an ethical premise 
that "defiance of institutional settlements touches ... the very 
foundations of civilized order, and that without civil order mo-
rality and justice in anybody's view of them is impossible."36 
The idea of a substantive relativity of value, in short, contained 
34. Id. at 121. 
35. Id. at 116. 
36. Id. at 120. But that element of ethical judgment necessary to the study of law 
would not disqualify Jaw as a science. Although knowledge about legal institutions could 
never be as positive and determinate as natural science's knowledge about inanimate 
matter, it also would not be totally indeterminate. "The science of society builds upon a 
vast reservoir of human experience and human reflection about the experience" that 
"makes plain that what is involved is a process of interaction between social ends and 
social means." Id. at 121. Since social means are fixed in terms of the context of a partic-
ular society, the range of possibility for the social scientist is considerably narrowed. 
Moreover, as the social.scientist considers the aims of the social institutions with which 
he is concerned, his inquiry is narrowed still further. Any remaining doubt about the 
social purposes can ultimately be resolved by the principle of institutional settlement 
itself. "By continuation of this process, the practicable range of choice . . . reaches a 
point at which the extremes of choice, however far apart they might seem, are relatively 
close together as compared with the range of choices that, as an original matter, might 
have been thought to be open," id. at 122, although "the course of action finally chosen 
will also have to be selected by an act of judgment," id. at 123. 
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the ground for an objective analysis of procedures through which 
substantive visions could compete peacefully, just as, for Dewey, 
the notion of value relativity contained the justification for dem-
ocracy, open debate, free and open inquiry, and tolerance of 
nonconformity. 
The normative charge of the fifties approach was contained 
within this realm of process. Because a commitment to the pro-
cedure of institutional settlement was implicated in the relativ-
ity of value premise itself, an institutional decision was entitled 
to respect regardless of its substance, so long as the appropriate 
procedures for resolving a dispute had been observed. The key 
issue in process theory accordingly would be how to identify the 
appropriate procedures for resolving various kinds of social dis-
putes. Once such procedures were identified, it would be possible 
to assert neutrally the application of the normative prong of the 
"principle of institutional settlement," the notion that a particu-
lar decision "ought to be respected." 
The idea of democracy was central. Because social decision 
making was at its heart "prudential," there could be no fixed 
test for the legitimacy of the substance or content of law. Rather 
than follow the traditionalist attempt to carve out a "public" 
realm of social life within which the legislature could regulate, 
distinct from a realm of "private" liberty from which the legisla-
ture would be kept out, the process-theorists implicitly accepted 
the social welfare implications of realist work in assuming that 
the range of questions across the substantive field were rooted in 
issues of social policy. There was no analytic separation between 
a private sphere characterized by neutral, framework principles 
and a public sphere characterized by social policy. Because there 
was no neutral, determinate way to evaluate substantive policy 
differences, they were ultimately "left to be made by count of 
noses at the ballot box. "37 
The combination of relativistic and objectivist approaches not 
only defined the separate realms of process and substance, but 
also characterized the discourse within the procedural realm it-
self. Alongside the democratic rhetoric, which was based on the 
assumption of ultimate relativity, was a discourse of dispute res-
olution based on an objectivist, social-science vision of func-
tional adaptation. The animating idea was that social disputes 
and institutional procedures could be categorized easily into a 
small set of types. Process-theorists justified procedures em-
ployed by various institutions through the idea that they were 
37. Id. at 123. 
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specially adapted to the particular kinds of issues that they con-
sidered. Hart and Sacks began their study in the Legal Process 
materials anthropologically, by noting the universal need in 
every society for some dispute-resolution procedures. In complex 
modern societies, "different procedures and personnel of differ-
ent qualifications invariably prove to be appropriate for deciding 
different kinds of questions."38 The process-theorists imagined 
that there could be a kind of natural, functional correlation be-
tween different kinds of disputes and different kinds of institu-
tions, so that the categories of dispute could be matched up with 
the kinds of institutional procedures corresponding to them. 
Combined with the premise of general democratic supremacy, 
this functional correlation between types of social disputes and 
various modes of "institutional competence" was the basic regu-
lative principle driving the organization of the Legal Process 
materials. 
Once one understands the basic idea of a dual commitment to 
democracy rooted in relativist assumptions and to other institu-
tional procedures based on objectively functional criteria, the ac-
tual institutional framework that was supposed to follow from 
these premises can be outlined fairly easily. First, at the most 
general level, substantive issues involving preferences, values, 
and ends were within the special competence of the legislature. 
If the legislature had spoken on such an issue, courts would fol-
low the legislative resolution because, under the principle of in-
stitutional settlement, the legislature was competent to decide 
those kinds of issues according to its democratic procedures. 
There would be a functional correlation between the nature of 
the dispute and the kind of procedure that had been utilized to 
resolve the dispute. "Duly established procedures for making de-
cisions of that kind" would have been followed. 
The fifties theorists accordingly shared the realists' opposition 
to Lochner and the liberty of contract approach, but not on the 
basis of any substantive or ethical opposition either to the mar-
ket ideology of liberty of contract or to the market reality of 
sweatshops and ghettos. Such substantive opposition to Lochner 
would lack neutrality since it would inevitably involve a value 
judgment. Instead, the fifties scholars opposed Lochner on what 
they saw as neutral procedural grounds. Precisely because the 
choice between the free market and regulation involved a value 
choice, the proper procedure to resolve that issue was the demo-
cratic process of the legislature. The inevitable fact that sub-
38. Id. at 3. 
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stantive value judgments would be contentious and controversial 
entailed a rational consensus about the functional necessity for 
appropriate institutional procedures to resolve substantive 
disputes. 
Similarly, the role of courts in the system of dispute resolution 
could be deduced from the institutional characteristics of the ju-
diciary. Under the institutional competence calculus, the relative 
competence of courts was marked by their ability to engage in 
what Hart and Sacks termed the method of "reasoned elabora-
tion."39 "Reasoned elaboration" referred to a sense of craft 
within which the judiciary could elaborate principles and poli-
cies contained within precedent and legislation to reach a rea-
soned, if not analytically determined, result in particular cases. 
In general, if an issue was capable of a reasoned resolution, the 
judiciary had jurisdiction to decide the issue so long as the legis-
lature had not already spoken. On the other hand, if an issue 
was not capable of "reasoned elaboration," that is, if it involved 
mere "preference" or "sheer guesswork,"'0 then it was beyond 
the competence of the judiciary and therefore outside the func-
tional jurisdiction of the courts. 41 
The process-theorists' image of the judiciary acting in either a 
common-law or statutory interpretation capacity contrasted 
sharply with the focus on the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" 
at the constitutional review level. The judiciary as painted by 
Hart and Sacks was starkly activist. Common-law judges were 
39. Id. at 165-68, 487. 
40. Id. at 123; see also H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (1968); Bickel 
& Wellington, Legislative Purpose and th Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957). 
41. The dispute between traditionalists and realists over the essential characteristics 
of law was resolved by a contextualizing pluralism within the contours of the judicial 
function. Sometimes a rule would be appropriate for the resolution of a particular kind 
of case, other times a standard would be appropriate. Nothing in the concept of law 
could tell you in advance which would be appropriate where; it was a "prudential" deci-
sion that depended on figuring out how the relevant social purposes could best be effec-
tuated in the particular situation. Similarly, there was nothing in the concept of law or 
courts that determined whether reasoning should proceed from deontological principles 
or utilitarian policies. Again, it depended on a prudential decision made in the context of 
a particular fact situation. The realist focus on policy and the traditionalist focus on 
principle would be pluralistically joined within the method of "reasoned elaboration." 
Similarly, some social issues would best be left to the realm of "private ordering"; others 
might require a form of official regulation. The determination of the market/regulation 
issue did not have to be made on an all-or-nothing basis because these kinds of decisions 
were also contextual, not essentialist. And thus in the field of contracts, for example, the 
strange combination of individualist premises, represented by classical contract doctrine, 
and collectivist premises, reflected in the protection of reliance interests and the general 
extension of duties beyond the terms of individual consent, could continue side by side 
because no fundamental choice between individualism and collectivism was necessary. 
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not limited to the application of neutral principles. Instead, they 
could also identify and help implement social policy. Rather 
than conceive legislation from the classical perspective as an ex-
ceptional, limited incursion into the grand common law, Hart 
and Sacks advocated that legislation be read in the same way as 
common-law precedent, as revealing principles and policies from 
which the judiciary might reason to a result in a particular con-
text. The rigid common law of the traditionalists could be re-
formed by judges acting as deputy legislators in bringing the le-
gal doctrines in line with the more general policies and 
principles of social life reflected in legislation. •2 Cardozo was a 
hero. 
The legitimacy of this activist and reformist judicial power at 
common law as a "special kind of decision of 'ought' " was based 
on both functionalist and democratic imagery. The functional 
justification for an activist common-law judiciary proceeded 
from the same analysis that revealed the need for institutional-
ized dispute resolution in the first place. It was structurally im-
possible for the democratically elected legislature to consider 
every particular social dispute that arose. Given the procedures 
of democratic decision making in representative central bodies, 
the legislature could consider only the most pressing and most 
general disputes that had been left unresolved in other institu-
tions. The legislature basically operated as a second-line dis-
pute-resolution forum. But there was a functional necessity for a 
front line of institutionalized dispute resolution to rule on the 
mass of conflicts that arose day-to-day in society, and that was 
the special role of the common-law courts.43 
This functional justification itself was ultimately rooted back 
to the legislature. The lack of traditional, rulelike boundaries to 
the power of common-law judges was justified by the fact that 
courts were only acting interstitially. The legislature could al-
ways change the common law if the courts took a path with 
42. And since the method of "reasoned elaboration" marked the boundaries of judi-
cial competence, the judiciary, when working in a statutory interpretation mode, would 
attribute reasonable purposes to the legislature and try to carry those purposes out in 
consequentialist fashion. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7, at 695. 
43. The courts' particular institutional competence was based in publicly having to 
rationalize decisions; the judiciary's "duly established procedure for making decisions" 
was the method of "reasoned elaboration" of the preexisting principles and policies re-
flected in judicial or legislative precedents. Accordingly, just as the special democratic 
character of the legislature made it institutionally competent to be the ultimate arbiter 
of substantive issues for which there was no possible neutral and objective resolution, the 
special rationalization process of the judiciary made it institutionally competent to de-
cide issues that were capable of reasoned, if ultimately only "prudential," resolution. 
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which the legislature strongly disagreed, and the issue was of 
sufficient general interest. Courts could accordingly see them-
selves as something like deputy legislators. They were engaged· 
in the same general, interrelated system of institutional settle-
ment, responding to the same social purpose to maximize the 
total satisfactions of cooperative group life. They also had been 
implicitly delegated the authority to decide issues according to 
the means of "reasoned elaboration" whenever the legislature, 
through statutory generality or statutory silence, left its wishes 
subject to interpretation. 
A similar "institutional competence" analysis determined 
when other institutions' decisions were legitimate under the 
terms of the "principle of institutional settlement." For exam-
ple, the functional competence of an administrative agency was 
characterized by its ability to acquire expertise over a special-
ized range of social life. The agency's democratic legitimacy 
flowed from seeing agencies, like courts, as deputy legislatures 
making law interstitially, always subject to legislative correction 
and acting within the limits as defined by the legislature. Just as 
the legislature implicitly delegated authority for frontline dis-
pute resolution to the courts, it often preferred to legislate 
through broad standards implemented by an expert group of ad-
ministrators responsible for crafting intermediate regulations to 
carry out the legislature's general purposes. Just as the implicit 
delegation of substantive decision making power to courts was 
interpreted as a delegation to the method of "reasoned elabora-
tion," so the delegation of substantive decision making to ad-
ministrators was interpreted as an implicit delegation to the 
method of "expertise." An agency decision was entitled to re-
spect under the principle of institutional settlement so long as 
the "duly established procedures" of decision making were fol-
lowed, that is, so long as the agency decision reflected the exper-
tise that functionally and democratically established its jurisdic-
tional limitations."" 
Similarly, the private sphere that the traditionalists had glori-
fied as the realm of liberty and freedom, and that the realists 
had derided as a sham, was reconceived by Hart and Sacks as 
simply another set of institutional procedures particularly ap-
44. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 8, at 1092-1143; F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC 
AND ITS GOVERNMENT 123-67 (1930); J. LANDIS, THE ADMINSJTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). For 
the story of the disintegration of expertise as the legitimating criterion of agency deci-
sion-making, see Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 1041 (1975); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975). 
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propriate for specific kinds of social transactions. The chief 
characteristics of this realm of "private ordering" were its flexi-
bility and decentralization; under the procedures of private or-
dering, arrangements could be closely tailored to the specific 
needs of the individual parties. It was always hoped that social 
issues could work themselves out without the need for official 
state intervention, but shortsightedness and overreaching on the 
part of economically strong parties, and the need for standardi-
zation and coordination of complex social arrangements, some-
times made regulation imperative. If judicial, legislative, or ad-
ministrative regulation was necessary, there was no qualitative 
conceptual or rhetorical hurdle to overcome to legitimate such 
intervention. Instead, regulation was simply another form of in-
stitutional interrelationship in the web of interlocking and com-
plementary governing arrangements that formed the process-
theorists' description of power in American society.411 
The grid of institutions described by Hart and Sacks (private 
ordering, legislation, administrative regulation, executive regula-
tion, and judicial lawmaking through the common law and statu-
tory interpretation) formed the basic framework for the process-
theory approach. While other writers worked out the process an-
alytic in particular institutional contexts (labor law, administra-
tive law, and federal courts were the areas of greatest concentra-
tion), the great significance of the Legal Process text lay in the 
possibility it held out that a seamless, symmetrical, and compre-
hensive vision of American law was still possible, regardless of 
the disintegration of the grand nineteenth-century models under 
the modernist and realist attacks. 
By focusing on institutional context, the process-theorists ac-
complished a transformation of how the category "law" was un-
derstood. Throughout American history, law had been conceived 
in mainstream discourse as a unified concept. Accordingly, when 
the legitimacy of law was impugned, it was always typically chal-
lenged in all of its manifestations. An attack on the power of 
judges in the Jacksonian period, for example, was conceived to 
include both common-law and constitutional judges. When the 
realists attacked the supposed neutrality of legal reasoning, they 
criticized law in both constitutional and common-law contexts. 
And when conservative opponents of the New Deal claimed that 
lawmaking by administrative agencies was illegitimate, they uti-
lized a concept of law gleaned from notions of how the judiciary 
should act. The process focus challenged this unified vision of 
45. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 8, at 207 -365. 
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law by contextualizing what "law" meant according to the par-
ticular setting in which law was made. This conceptual turn 
opened up the possibility that the test of the legitimacy, say, of 
agency decisiOJ?.S need not be the same as the test for the legiti-
macy of common-law decisions. It revealed a sophisticated un-
derstanding that "agreements" in the so-called private market 
were a particular form of lawmaking.'6 And, more starkly, this 
kind of contextualizing meant that the test for the legitimacy of 
common-law or statutory interpretation lawmaking would not be 
the same as the test for the legitimacy of the judiciary when act-
ing in a constitutional review capacity. The issue of "judicial ac-
tivism" would, of course, survive. But the connection between 
the legitimacy of constitutional review and other judicial roles 
was severed. Which brings us back to Wechsler. 
Ill. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
[W]hether you are tolerant ... of the ad hoc in politics, 
with principle reduced to a manipulative tool, are you 
not also ready to agree that something else is called for 
from the courts? I put it to you that the main constituent 
of the judicial 'process is precisely that it must be genu-
inely principled, resting with respect to every step that is 
involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons 
quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved . 
. . . [l]t has become a commonplace to grant what 
many for so long denied: that courts in constitutional de-
terminations face issues that are inescapably "political" 
... in that they involve a choice among competing val-
ues or desires, a choice reflected in the legislative or exec-
utive action in question, which the court must either con-
demn or condone. 
. . . But what is crucial, I submit, is not the nature of 
the question but the nature of the answer that may val-
idly be given by the courts. No legislature or executive is 
obligated by the nature of its function to support its 
choice of values by the type of reasoned explanation that 
I have suggested is intrinsic to judicial action-however 
46. See Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937). 
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much we may admire such a reasoned exposition when 
we find it in those other realms.47 
A theory of judicial review was critical for the completion of 
the fifties institutional competence approach. The issue would 
have been important in any event within process theory because 
it involves the relationship between two major decision-making 
institutions. Its significance was exponentially increased because 
the process-theorists put enormous weight on the legitimacy of 
the legislature within the general institutional framework. It was 
the legislature's democratic character that made it appropriate 
as the final arbiter of substantive decision making and the root 
of the legitimacy of the other decision-making institutions, such 
as common-law courts, administrative agencies, and courts en-
gaging in statutory interpretation, whether acting interstitially 
or as deputy legislators. 
Moreover, the "institutional competence" of the judiciary at 
the constitutional law level was necessarily different from the ju-
diciary's competence in other roles. If "reasoned elaboration" 
was the loose, flexible kind of decision making that characterized 
common-law adjudication and statutory interpretation in the 
Hart and Sacks model, it lost its claim to legitimacy where it no 
longer played merely an interstitial role. In the judicial review 
context, there was no functional basis, such as the need for a 
front line of dispute resolution in the absence of legislative con-
sideration, that could justify the exercise of judicial power. And, 
of course, it could not have the democratic legitimacy suggested 
by the image of an implicit delegation from the legislature, since 
judicial review confronts legislative action itself. The functional 
distinction between roles explains how the fifties scholars could 
view judicial action in common-law and statutory interpretation 
roles and administrative action as legitimately activist and re-
formist and yet be staunchly opposed to judicial activism at the 
level of constitutional law. 
The image of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" captures 
the issues that formed the starting point for most fifties consti-
tutional scholars. They accepted the realist idea that all sub-
stantive decision making involved controversial value choices 
and viewed the laboratory of democracy as the final arbiter of 
substantive value. Therefore, there seemed to be no basis for the 
exercise of judicial review, except perhaps where the legislature 
had violated a clear and determinate constitutional provision. 
47. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 15-16. 
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Wechsler was writing in a context in which this narrow view of 
judicial review was quickly becoming the consensus in legal 
scholarship. The great debates between Hand, Wechsler, and 
Bickel about the power of judicial review all took place within 
the discourse of process theory.'8 Although they worked out 
their arguments differently, Hand, Wechsler, and Bickel all de-
fined judicial power through a comparison of the institutional 
competence of the legislature and the judiciary. They all con-
cluded that the democratic character of legislative decision mak-
ing dictated a severely constrained realm of judicial review. 
This kind of approach to constitutional law is still so familiar 
to us that it may be difficult to see that, in terms of the tradi-
tionalist constitutional law analytic that it replaced, the process 
perspective represented a major transformation of discourse. 
The traditionalists had always tried to derive the power of judi-
cial review directly from a substantive political theory. They 
conceived the function of judicial review in geographic terms, to 
protect a sphere of private rights from the substantive reach of 
the legislature. And thus their articulation of the liPPropriate 
realm of judicial review was based on an analytic distinction be- . 
tween public and private areas of social life. The scope of judi-
cial review flowed naturally from the definition of legal rights 
contained in a substantive political theory. It needed no other 
justification than the neutrality and objectivity of the view of 
the private realm of freedom that it protected. The realist dem-
onstration of the inevitably public context within which so-
called private rights were exercised, and the logic of the New 
Deal social welfare ideology, stood directly opposed to the tradi-
tional vision of the role of constitutional law because it belied 
the substantive premise for a delineation of a realm of private 
rights divorced from social power. 
The fifties constitutional theorists reflected their realist so-
phistication by rejecting the possibility that a substantive theory 
of rights could determine the proper scope of judicial review. In-
stead, they focused on procedure rather than on substance, on 
institutional competence rather than on any distinction between 
48. The Neutral Principles article was first presented as the 1959 Holmes Lecture at 
Harvard. The previous year Learned Hand had used the same forum to make his argu-
ment that the scope of judicial review should be severely circumscribed because the 
power was inferred from the structure of the separation of powers rather than dictated 
by the text of the Constitution. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). Bickel re-
sponded to their positions in The Least Dangerous Branch. A BICKEL, supra note 5, at 
46-65. Wechsler began his lecture by disputing Hand's premise, finding textual support 
for judicial review in the supremacy clause and the notion that the Court was obligated 
to adjudicate any case within its jurisdiction. 
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private right and public power. The task of constitutional theory 
was to develop the boundaries for the institutional competence 
of the judiciary when acting in the special role of judicial review, 
just as Hart and Sacks had identified the appropriate bounda-
ries for the judiciary at common-law and in statutory interpreta-
tion modes. 
Wechsler's solution, reflected in the passage that opens this 
section, utilized all the main elements of the process approach. 
Initially, he echoed the more general rhetoric through which the 
fifties scholars domesticated the realist argument that all law in-
volved political judgments. While acknowledging that "courts in 
constitutional determinations face issues that are inescapably 
'political,' "49 Wechsler limited that concession to the realists by 
placing it within the broader context of the principle of institu-
tional settlement. The boundaries of judicial competence repre-
sented by the sphere of "political questions" did not envelop the 
whole of constitutional law, but merely the particular kinds of 
issues that were not amenable to resolution according to the 
court's functional method, the reasoned elaboration of neutral 
principles. The "political question" doctrine was thus only a 
particular, doctrinal instance of the more general institutional 
settlement calculus within which any institution's jurisdiction to 
determine an issue ran out at the point where its procedures 
were not functionally adapted to the particular conflict. Political 
issues merely required the judiciary to do what it must do gener-
ally in judicial review: interpret the Constitution to determine 
which institution was the "duly established" one for the resolu-
tion of that particular kind of dispute. 
The notion that broad judicial deference to legislative judg-
ment avoided controversial constitutional issues was therefore, 
in Wechsler's view, incoherent. There was no conceptual way for 
the courts to avoid, at least implicitly, passing on the constitu-
tionality of legislation as it carried out the judicial function of 
adjudication. Even as the judiciary appeared not to rule on "po-
litical questions," deference to the legislature involved an im-
plicit judicial determination that the Constitution gave the legis-
lature the authority to decide the particular issue. 
The realist's assertion that there was no way to avoid making 
a judgment on the legality of a challenged exercise of power was 
correct. "No decision" was really a decision. But constitutional 
review did not need to be "inevitably political" because the judi-
ciary could decide on principled, proceduralist grounds: "[W]hat 
49. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 15. 
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is crucial ... is not the nature of the question but the nature of 
the answer that may validly be given by the courts." Although 
the substantive issues underlying all constitutional determina-
tions present "a choice among competing values," there was a 
principled way to review the constitutionality of legislation 
through "the type of reasoned explanation ... intrinsic to judi-
cial action." Thus, the determination that a "political question" 
was presented meant that the issue was beyond the institutional 
competence of the Court because it was not amenable to reason-
ing through neutral principles. Conversely, when the Court could 
. give neutral principles in support of its determination, constitu-
tional review would be legitimate and not antidemocratic be-
cause, by definition, value judgments would not be at stake. 
Instead of a constitutional theory based on the content of de-
cisions, Wechsler offered one based on the procedures that the 
Court must observe in coming to decisions. Such procedures 
would distinguish the legal character· of courts from the political 
character of legislatures. Politics was the realm where principles 
were merely instrumental "manipulative tools," used in ad hoc 
and result-oriented fashion to further a particular substantive 
interest.110 Law, on the other hand, was genuinely principled be-
cause it rested on the process of "reasoned explanation," on 
"reasons quite transcending the immediate result."111 While leg-
islatures might conduct a consequentialist analysis of "gains and 
losses," the courts, when exercising the power of judicial review, 
could not be utilitarian or consequentialist.112 While common-law 
courts might consider both policy and principle, courts engaged 
in constitutional review confronted the policy choices of a demo-
cratically elected legislature and therefore could consider only 
"neutral principles," not policy judgments. The judiciary in this 
context needed criteria "that can be framed and tested as an 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. This distinction between reason and will reflected the rejection of what Wechsler 
perceived as the illegitimate positivism of the realists that led to the notion that might 
makes right. "Those who perceive in law only the element of fiat . . . will not join gladly 
in the search for standards ... [nor will those who] frankly or covertly make the test of 
virtue in interpretation whether its result in the immediate decision seems to hinder or 
advance the interests ... they support." Id. at 11. 
Like the process-theorists generally, Wechsler was drawing a distinction between pro-
cess and substance as the basis for constitutional interpretation: a result-oriented consti-
tutional theory was illegitimate because it could not be neutral-it was inevitably tied to 
"interests" that the proponent wanted to hinder or advance, and it conceived of the 
court in simply positive terms, as a "naked power organ." 
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exercise of reason and not merely as an act of willfulness or 
will."11s 
Wechsler then applied these standards to particular constitu-
tional cases. First, like others, he criticized the Supreme Court's 
resolution of various desegregation and obscenity cases in which 
the Court had acted per curiam. Because the Court's functional 
legitimacy was tied to the reasons given for its decisions, judg-
ments that offered no reasons for its results could not be legiti-
mate. Those were the easy cases of illegitimate decision making 
under the proceduralist analytic. 
Wechsler next praised the Court's broad reading of Congres-
sional power in the commerce clause decisions since the mid-
thirties. Because there was no basis for principled distinctions 
about the range of federal legislative power, the interpretation of 
the commerce clause was like a "political question," outside the 
realm of constitutional review because its resolution required 
judgments of value and expediency.64 And he found the Su-
preme Court's abandonment of the Lochner-era liberty-of-con-
tract approach legitimate because he could find no principled 
and neutral basis upon which to distinguish permissible and im-
permissible regulation of the economy. 
Finally, in the discussion with which his article is most closely 
associated, Wechsler criticized the Court's decisions in the white 
primary cases,55 in Shelley v. Kraemer,66 and in Brown v. Board 
of Education57 according to the same test of legitimacy: the 
analysis of whether the kind of issue that the Court considered 
53. Id. at 11. This kind of foundation for the power of judicial review would, of 
course, be looser than that suggested by Hand. While Hand warned that enforcement of 
the Constitution beyond the clear text and its history would make the Court a "third 
legislative chamber," without the legitimacy of democratic procedures, L. HAND, supra 
note 48, at 42, Wechsler emphasized that the text was rarely clear and, in any event, 
neither text, history, nor precedent could make constitutional interpretation totally de-
terminate because the legitimacy of judicial action always depended on the strength of 
the reasons articulated for the decision through the method of reasoned elaboration. 
Constitutional provisions did not embody "finite rule[s) of law," but instead "special 
values" which were susceptible to "adaptation and adjustment" when necessary. Wechs-
ler, supra note 1, at 19. In short, Wechsler was not a substantive formalist; he perceived 
the content of constitutional law in terms of general standards rather than traditional 
determinate rules. The appropriate role for the critic was to determine whether the 
method of principled resolution was satisfied, whether the Court stayed within its insti-
tutional competence. The legitimacy of judicial review turned not on the content of the 
issues resolved, but "on the kinds of answers given to the questions posed." Id. at 16. 
54. In any event, the states were represented in Congress, and thus the process of 
Congressional decision making could be counted on to reflect state interests. See W echs-
ler, supra note 1, at 24. 
55. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
56. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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was amenable to resolution by neutral principles. Wechsler as-
serted his personal support for the results of the antisegregation 
decisions, saying they "have the best chance of making an en-
during contribution to the quality of our society of any that I 
know in recent years."118 But the test of their legitimacy, if one 
were truly committed to the rule of law rather than expediency, 
was not whether one agreed with the content of the results or 
with the value choices they reflected, but rather whether they 
rested on the appropriate procedure for resolving constitutional 
disputes, that is, the procedure of reasoning through neutral 
principles. 
The determination that "private" political parties were sub-
ject to constitutional norms in the white primary cases, and the 
conclusion that state court enforcement of racially restrictive 
residential covenants was unconstitutional in Shelley u. Krae-
mer, 119 both failed this test because the Court did not even dis-
cuss how the requisite state action was involved. Wechsler re-
jected the argument that constitutional norms should be 
extended beyond official government action because many so-
called private parties-like giant corporations-wielded power 
comparable to that of formal state agencies. Such a functionalist 
analysis of the character and degree of power exercised by vari-
ous groups in society was beyond the judicial competence be-
cause it could not be resolved on a principled basis. The issues 
involved questions of judgment, and· therefore the determination 
of how far to extend constitutional norms beyond official state 
action should be dealt with by legislation "where there is room 
for drawing lines that courts are not equipped to draw."60 
Wechsler's critique of the Brown decision then followed from 
these same premises. Brown was illegitimate because it rested on 
factual contingencies or value judgments rather than on neutral 
principles. The finding that segregated schools were "inherently 
unequal" was not principled ground for the constitutional ruling 
because it was fact-specific to the sociological testimony in the 
particular case. Expert witnesses in other school cases testified 
in contrary ways, and, in any event, Wechsler contended that 
the social-science evidence was relative to the specific research 
upon which the conclusion of inequality and harm rested and to 
the specific questions that the expert was asked. 
58. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 27. 
59. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
60. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 31. 
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Wechsler speculated that the decision really was not based on 
the sociological evidence of harm to black children from segrega-
tion, but instead rested on the view that racial segregation must 
necessarily entail denial of equality to the minority, "the group 
that is not dominant politically and, therefore, does not make 
the choice involved."61 But this ground also could not be princi-
pled, because it either made constitutionality turn on the subjec-
tive motive of the legislature or on the subjective interpretation 
of the legislation by those subject to it, who "choose" to see seg-
regation as inequality or who "resent" segregation. A principled 
analysis would make the constitutional determination turn on 
the objective character of the legislation itself. If there were ob-
jectively equal facilities, Wechsler argued, the question whether 
racial segregation entailed inequality necessarily depended on 
one's point of view, implicating a value choice that the judiciary 
did not have the institutional competence to make. 
According to Wechsler, Brown actually involved a "conflict of 
human claims" in the application of the "freedom to associ-
ate. "62 Legislated segregation denied freedom to associate to 
those who wished it, but integration forced association on those 
for whom interracial association might be "unpleasant or repug-
nant."63 What was involved was a conflict between different so-
cial interests, a conflict that no neutral principle could resolve. 
IV. THE FORMALISM OF PROCESS 
I have described some features of the conceptual and cultural 
history underlying Wechsler's rhetoric in order to recover the 
sense of how Wechsler and the other fifties lawyers could believe 
that their commitment to procedural and institutional analysis 
was not only neutral and uncontroversial but simultaneously lib-
eral and progressive, inspired by an authentic devotion to de-
mocracy and the rule of law and posed against the forces of dic-
tatorship and oppression. Central to the way that American legal 
discourse was reorganized in the fifties were the ideas that a 
commitment to democracy made a substantive theory of justice 
unnecessary, and that a focus on procedural legitimacy made the 
rule of law possible. In the context of the post-War discourse of 
American intellectuals, Wechsler's procedural and institutional 
61. Id. at 33. 
62. Id. at 34. 
63. Id. 
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focus in constitutional theory is recognizable as part of a much 
wider phenomenon: the coalescence of an entire generation of 
mainstream scholars around a single discourse to determine the 
basic legitimacy of power in the United States. The fifties intel-
lectuals rested their resistance to the more radical, an-
tiauthoritarian implications of the disintegration of the old or-
der, and their faith that American social power was 
distinguishable from the mere rule of force and could be legiti-
mated on an apolitical normative basis, on the distinction be-
tween process and substance. 
I have tried to make the Neutral Principles argument com-
prehensible in light of the idea that legitimate legal analysis 
must take place within the contours of the overriding distinction 
between process and substance and within a normative under-
standing of the functional limitations of various institutionalized 
modes of dispute resolution. In this description, Wechsler's op-
position to Brown appears to flow automatically from the deter-
mination that the case involved value judgments. Given the pre-
mise of "equal facilities," there was no objective basis upon 
which to find inequality in Brown. Given no objective, value-free 
basis on which to decide, the case presented a "political ques-
tion" outside the jurisdiction of the judicial competence when 
acting in the constitutional review context. 
But this image of analytic necessity, the idea that Wechsler's 
opposition to Brown was determined by the conceptual structure 
of post-War intellectual discourse, is illusory. The rhetoric of 
process theory could only be appealing if one already possessed 
a particular outlook and attitude toward the legitimacy of the 
social arrangements of American society such that one could be-
lieve that the norms that characterized the rhetoric of process 
discourse also characterized day-to-day life in the institutions 
that the fifties writers considered. Some link had to be made 
between process theory as a utopian possibility and process the-
ory as an accurate description of the ordinary workings of Amer-
ican social life. Rather than being the "source" for substantive 
value choices made in American institutional life, the intense 
commitment by fifties scholars such as Wechsler to procedural-
ism was the effect of a particular, and benign, view of American 
society within which the possibility of social domination had 
been defined away. The normative prong of the process ap-
proach resolved the antinomy between the "is" and the "ought" 
that characterized the rupture between previous generations of 
legal scholars by simply conflating the "is" with the "ought," by 
assuming that the abstract norms of democratic choice and cul-
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tural tolerance were also concrete characteristics of American 
society. 
The resolution of the traditionalist/realist debate through the 
process approach was an ingenious compromise between the for-
malism of the traditionalists and the relativism that realism 
threatened only if the process/substance distinction could actu-
ally be drawn, only if proceduralist analysis could proceed nor-
matively because it was divorced from the inevitable controversy 
of substantive decision making. But the process/substance dis-
tinction could not have dictated the positions that Wechsler and 
others took because the distinction was analytically indetermi-
nate; in order to apply the institutional competence analytic, 
one had to make substantive political and ethical judgments 
about the permissible range and extent of institutional power. 
The confidence on the part of the fifties legal scholars that the 
distinction between process and substance transcended the old 
antinomies between the traditionalists and realists was mis-
placed. The very same issues that the fifties scholars thought 
they were avoiding through the geographical delineation be-
tween a relativist, policy-based substantive realm and a norma-
tive, but neutral and determinate, procedural realm reemerged 
in the actual application of the proceduralist solution. In other 
words, even accepting at the abstract level the notion that a 
meaningful inquiry into the legitimacy of a particular exercise of 
power could consist of a jurisdictional analysis of whether an ap-
propriate forum, employing appropriate procedures, had re-
solved a dispute, there was still no way to implement the ap-
proach in concrete instances without reverting either to an 
empty formalism that bore the discredited tradition of Lochner-
era essentialism, or to a functionalist determination of proce-
dural legitimacy that always implicated the very substantive is-
sues that process-theorists had conceded were inherently 
political. 
I will develop this argument by focusing on Wechsler's treat-
ment of Brown. 64 Here I return to the questions that opened this 
essay: Why didn't the actual distribution of wealth, jobs, politi-
64. Now, at the outset, the concentration on Wechsler's opposition to Brown may 
seem too easy a target for critique, given the near-universal acceptance of Brown in our 
contemporary context, and the fact that later process-theorists, most notably John Hart 
Ely, have refined the analytic so that at least the result in Brown is rendered compatible 
with the basic process/substance distinction. But Wechsler's analysis of the Brown deci-
sion reveals endemic characteristics of process theory that mark the approach whatever 
the specific institution under analysis. Moreover, it is important to focus on the reigning 
image of legislative legitimacy because the fifties theorists and later scholars following 
their intellectual agenda made the democratic character of the legislature the ground for 
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. cal power, intellectual prestige, educational opportunity, hous-
ing, and social status between whites and blacks in fifties 
America prove the inequality that Wechsler could not find from 
the fact of segregated schools in Brown? More generally, why 
wasn't the fact that the school segregation in Brown was only a 
part of a pervasive social structure of state-supported institu-
tionalized racism enough to justify the Court's conclusion that 
segregated public schools were part of the social subordination 
of blacks? 
The quick answer to these questions should be clear at this 
point. The determination whether broad scale social domination 
of blacks existed-so that the segregation in Brown would be 
seen as part of a larger social inequality-was a value question. 
Therefore, it was beyond the judicial competence to decide. 
It is important to emphasize this point. Wechsler was not as-
serting that broad-scale racial domination did not exist. He was 
saying that such inquiries into social, historically contingent 
power relations between groups were inherently political and 
value-laden. As Wechsler posed the issue of equality, it was ei-
ther explicable in terms of an objective, principled comparison 
of concrete facilities such as school buildings, or it depended on 
the personal and subjective, even psychologically based, reac-
tions of blacks who "choose to put that construction upon" ra-
cial segregation and women who "resent" gender segregation. 
The imagery of choice and psychological resentment contraste~ 
with the imagery of the comparison of facilities in the same way 
that values contrasted with facts. The "equal facility" compari-
son could be factual and objective, not a matter of individual 
opinion, psychology, or will. 611 Because any determination 
whether segregation was part of a system of social inequality 
would inevitably require the consideration of subjective factors, 
it would necessarily involve a substantive evaluation of society 
that the judiciary, by virtue of its elite, unelected character, was 
not competent to perform. Because value judgments were 
outside the judicial competence in the constitutional role, the 
only principled way to resolve the case was to treat it like a "po-
litical question" and therefore neutrally to decide, on institu-
the legitimacy of all other institutional procedures and the justification for their assump-
tions that their own approaches were progressive, liberatory, and antielitist. 
65. It is hard to believe that Wechsler was actually implying that racial domination 
was all in the heads of blacks in the 1950's; instead, by individualizing as choice or psy-
chological reaction the way that blacks and women understood segregation, Wechsler was 
trying to highlight the contingent and subjective nature of any evaluation of power in 
society. 
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tional competence grounds, that the legislature was the appro-
priate institution to resolve the issue. The concept of democratic 
self-determination meant that the judiciary could not pretend to 
decide neutrally issues that were really political in that they de-
pended on a choice to interpret the social world in one way 
rather than another. In upholding the constitutionality of school 
segregation, the Court would not be ruling on the value question 
whether such segregation involved a denial of equality, but in-
stead would be holding that the issue was not amenable to judi-
cial procedures of dispute resolution. 
Now, at this point, one could argue with the way that Wechs-
ler categorized the world he described. Even if one believes that 
it is noncontroversial to assume a fundamental distinction be-
tween "objective" facts and "subjective" feelings, represented in 
Wechsler's rhetoric as the contrast between "concrete facilities" 
and "choice" or "resentment," it seems already to reveal a par-
ticular ideology for Wechsler to assert as a real possibility in 
1958 that the identification of racial domination depended on 
subjective feelings rather than objective facts, that it was contro-
versial to describe race relations in fifties America as marked by 
"inequality." But rather than focus on Wechsler's particular cat-
egorization, I want to proceed by assuming that Wechsler prop-
erly characterized the question of inequality as "subjective," as 
not susceptible of neutral, principled resolution. The issue here 
is what was supposed to follow from that premise. 
In Wechsler's discourse, it followed automatically that if there 
was no neutral way for the judiciary to resolve the issue of racial 
segregation, it was to be left to the legislature. But there was, in 
fact, no necessary analytic link from the proposition that it was 
a value question whether school segregation was a form of social 
inequality to the conclusion that deference to legislative judg-
ment was in order. Even on its own terms, Wechsler's institu-
tional analysis was ultimately incomplete and flawed. According 
to the principle of institutional settlement, deference to another 
institution's resolution of a particular issue depended on a deter-
mination that "duly established procedures for making decisions 
of that kind" had been followed. Finding that the issue in Brown 
involved a value judgment constituted merely half the analy-
sis-before deference to the legislature was in order, the judici-
ary would have to decide that the legislature actually employed 
the procedures that made it competent to decide the issue, that 
is, that the legislature was truly democratic. Just as an adminis-
trative agency decision was not entitled to deference if the 
processes of expertise were not applied, so a legislative decision 
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was not entitled to deference under the principle of institutional 
settlement if the processes of democracy did not characterize the 
legislative decision. 
Recall that, in the imagery of "the counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty,"66 the basis for the Court's limited competence in the role 
of judicial review was inferred from a comparison of the relative 
competence of the judiciary and the legislature. The constitu-
tional court was confined to a principled, value-free analysis be-
cause it lacked the democratic legitimacy that the legislature en-
joyed, and therefore when it confronted legislative choices, it 
could not legitimately impose its own values. 
But if the legislature were not democratic, there would be no 
basis for deference to the legislature and conversely no justifica-
tion for the limitation of the judicial role to a "neutral" analysis. 
The key issue was how the democratic character of the legisla-
ture would be identified. The identification of appropriate judi-
cial procedures itself rested on that determination. 
It is striking that the fifties constitutional law theorists who 
made the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" the centerpiece of 
their entire theoretical approach never bothered to consider the 
legitimacy of legislative action. 67 Although Wechsler's argument 
for "neutral principles" reflected his commitment to an institu-
tional competence analysis, and although his analysis concluded 
that the lack of a principled resolution required deference to the 
legislature, he failed to complete the analysis by applying the 
institutional competence calculus to the legislature itself. The 
limitation of the judiciary to "neutral principles" flowed from 
the democratic character of the legislature, but the institutional 
analysis as carried out in the fifties always stopped short of con-
sidering whether the actual basis for this deference existed. 
One explanation for the failure even to consider the basis for 
the legitimacy of legislative action in the fifties is that, framed in 
terms of their reaction to authoritarianism, the fifties lawyers 
66. A. BICKEL, supra note 5, at 16. 
67. Not until John Hart Ely's refinement of process theory in the mid-seventies did a 
process theorist in constitutional law even begin to set forth a critical framework for 
distinguishing between legislation that deserved deference because it reflected the demo-
cratic processes that made the legislature competent to decide substantive issues and 
legislation not entitled to respect because it called the legislature's democratic legitimacy 
into question by "closing the channels of political change" or by burdening a "discrete 
and insular minority" structurally unable to protect itself in pluralist, interest group 
politics. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). While not directly the subject of 
this Essay, it is worth noting that, although Ely's work constitutes a massive refinement 
of process theory, it also exposes the status-quo-oriented bias of the approach. See gen-
erally Parker, supra note 7. 
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simply took it as an article of unquestionable faith that Ameri-
can society was fundamentally democratic. They simply as-
sumed the democratic legitimacy of the legislature and built the 
rest of their institutional calculus around that assumption. 
But the failure of the process-theorists to consider the legisla-
ture's legitimacy reflects a myopia in process theory that runs 
deeper than the specific historical context of the reaction to fas-
cism. Instead, it is merely one facet of the more general ten-
dency on the part of the fifties generation of legal scholars to 
present their stance as neutral and apolitical based on suppres-
sion of the very possibility of social domination from their vi-
sion. In each application of process theory, they employed an 
institutional formalism to avoid the analytic problem that the 
legitimacy of an institutional process depended on a substantive 
determination of the justice of a particular institutional decision. 
This formalism assumed away the possibility that the institution 
in question might not actually work as imagined in the grid of 
institutional competence theory. 
Had Wechsler addressed the issue of the procedural legiti-
macy of the legislature, he would have confronted the problem 
that the substantive issue in Brown-whether segregated public 
schools were part of a social structure of domination and ine-
quality-was implicated in the institutional competence deter-
mination whether the legislature could be characterized as dem-
ocratic. There was no neutral way to decide the case on the basis 
of relative institutional processes because, in the identification 
of "democracy," process and substance overlapped. If the segre-
gation of public schools was part of a state-supported institu-
tionalized domination of blacks, the conclusion that the legisla-
ture was democratically legitimate was impugned unless 
democracy was consistent with such a widespread social domina-
tion that the concept lost its coherence as a legitimizer of social 
decision making. By advocating deference to legislative judg-
ment, Wechsler was implicitly taking a substantive stand on the 
issues as he identified them. He assumed that social domination 
of blacks either did not exist or that such a racial regime did not 
impugn the legitimacy of the legislature. 
An analysis of the democratic legitimacy of the legislature 
would have exposed the inevitable indeterminacy and circularity 
of the process analytic. If the determination of the institutional 
legitimacy of the legislature ultimately depended on a substan-
tive and value-laden analysis of the actual power relations ex-
isting in society, the limitation of the judiciary to a neutral prin-
ciples analysis meant that the judiciary would never be able to 
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determine whether the legislature was in fact. democratic, or 
whether society was instead rife with social and political domi-
nation. The institutional competence analysis ultimately rested 
on this analytic loop-the judiciary had to defer to legislative 
value judgments because the judiciary was unelected and there-
fore incompetent vis-a-vis the legislature to make value choices, 
but the democratic character of the legislature, the ground for 
the deference, could never be determined by the courts because 
it depended on the resolution of issues of value that were be-
yond the judicial competence. The limitations on the judiciary 
that were inferred from the democratic nature of the legislature 
prevented the judiciary from determining the democratic legiti-
macy of the legislature in order to justify those limits in the first 
place. The determination of the institutional legitimacy of the 
legislature, from which the circumscribed power of judicial re-
view was inferred through the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," 
was beyond the competence of the judiciary given the "counter-
majoritarian difficulty." 
This analytic circularity is most obvious in Wechsler's treat-
ment of the white primary cases. Wechsler's complaint about the 
Court's holdings in Smith v. Allwright68 and Terry v. Adams69 
that major political parties could not exclude blacks from voting 
in primaries to choose candidates for state-sponsored elections 
was that the Court failed to show how the requisite state action 
was manifest, since the parties were at least formally private. 
Wechsler reflected his realist sophistication in his openness to 
the possibility that other "power aggregates in our society"70 
might functionally exercise power similar to the state and there-
fore should be subject to the same constitutional norms. In 
short, there was no formal, on/off bright line that distinguished 
state power from private power. It was a question of degree and 
function rather than of essential characteristics. But precisely 
because it was a question of degree, a policy determination, the 
Court was incompetent to decide the issue. Instead, under the 
typology of institutional competence analysis, the constitutional-
review Court was to defer to legislative balancing "where there is 
room for drawing lines that courts are not equipped to draw."71 
In the dynamic of Wechsler's argument, the realist sophistica-
tion about the limits of substantive formalism-here the inabil-
68. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
69. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
70. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 31. 
71. Id. 
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ity to identify the difference between the private and public 
realms except through consequentialist applications of public 
policy-was immediately grafted onto a normative theory of in-
stitutional formalism, ironic and bizarre in the white primary 
context because the very issue under consideration concerned 
the democratic legitimacy of a legislature that was a product of 
racially exclusive election schemes. Only by assuming at the ab-
stract, schematic level of institutional competence analysis that 
policy questions belonged in the legislative domain could Wechs-
ler have failed to notice the circularity of his argument. 
The problem was that, just as the realists showed that the tra-
ditionalist concepts of free will and duress were analytically in-
determinate, and therefore that their application in any particu-
lar context required a policy judgment, so the procedures that 
were supposed to legitimate decision making by various institu-
tions under process theory were indeterminate and could only be 
applied through sub rosa substantive judgments. For example, 
the conclusion that the legislature was democratic rested on the 
judgment that life in American society was open and free 
enough to be called "democratic," just as the traditionalist con-
clusion that particular contracts were the result of free will 
rather than social power rested on the judgment that economic 
life was based in individual choice rather than structural con-
straint. But there was no analytic reason why process theory 
could not be applied in dramatically different, and critical, fash-
ion-if one started the institutional competence analysis under 
the principle of institutional settlement by first considering the 
competence of the legislature, and if one determined that de-
mocracy was inconsistent with the pervasive social domination 
of blacks, then there would be no basis for the limitation of the 
judiciary to neutral principles and no basis for questioning the 
institutional legitimacy of the Court in a case like Brown. 
The very same substantive issues that a democratic institution 
was supposed to decide, given the modernist premise of the im-
possibility of an objective theory of substantive justice, were im-
plicated in the determination of whether the legislature was a 
democratic institution. And this wasn't simply true in the dra-
matic context of Brown, where the connection between the sub-
stantive issues in the case and the institutional legitimacy of the 
legislature seems, at least in retrospect, obvious. Take, for an-
other example, the issue of the distribution of wealth, the very 
paradigm of the kind of subject matter that was within the 
unique competence of the legislature because it involved politi-
cal and ideological controversies that, after the realist attack, 
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process-theorists were convinced had no principled resolution. 
Given the controversial nature of economic policy about, say, 
rates of subsidy and taxation, the institutional grid of process 
theory assigned the issue to legislative resolution. But the distri-
bution of wealth was also implicated in the determination· of 
whether democracy existed in the first place, and thus whether 
any legislative resolution of such issues about the distribution of 
wealth was legitimate and worthy of respect as a "special kind of 
decision of 'ought.'" Before deferring to the legislature on eco-
nomic issues, the Court would have to conclude that the existing 
distribution of wealth was consistent with democratic self-deter-
mination. The substantive controversy for which one wanted 
democratic resolution was implicated in the determination of 
whether democracy existed in any particular context, unless one 
was willing to say democracy was consistent with any distribu-
tion of wealth, no matter how lopsided and regardless of what 
degree of privation it implied for those at the bottom. 
This analytic loop was not limited to consideration of the le-
gitimacy of the legislature. It was endemic to process theory in 
all of its institutional contexts, because it reflected the re-emer-
gence, within the process approach, of the opposition between 
formalism and functionalism that the process-theorists thought 
they had transcended through the distinction between process 
and substance. There was no neutral way to distinguish between 
substance and process because the very same controversial sub-
stantive issues that made a theory of procedural neutrality at-
tractive were always potentially implicated in determining the 
procedural legitimacy of any particular institutional decision. 
For example, the "duly established procedures" of collective 
bargaining were centered around the duty to bargain in good 
faith. Process-theorists working in labor law drew a sharp dis-
tinction between the legitimate enforcement of the procedures of 
collective bargaining and the illegitimate imposition of substan-
tive terms on management or labor. But one couldn't know 
whether each side bargained in good faith unless one could dis-
tinguish an employer's good faith negotiation from a bad faith 
desire to bust the union. And that determination in turn might 
rest on whether the employer had rejected a substantive union 
proposal that was reasonable in the circumstances. Similarly, 
one couldn't know whether an administrative decision was enti-
tled to respect until it was determined whether expertise was 
applied, and one couldn't determine whether expertise was ap-
plied until one distinguished substantive decisions that would be 
foolish by expert standards from decisions that would be reason-
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able by expert standards. In the process approach to federalism 
issues, one couldn't tell whether state-court determinations of 
federal law should stand unless one determined that the federal 
issues received a "full and fair hearing,"72 but one couldn't de-
termine the fairness of the hearing unless one determined 
whether the state judiciary was hostile to federal claims, and one 
couldn't determine that without looking to the actual substan-
tive disposition of the federal issues. 
The application of the premises of process theory could re-
quire the very substantive choices that the focus on process was 
supposed to avoid. The procedural attributes that were sup-
posed to define the competence of the various modes of social 
decision making-"democratic decision making," "good faith 
bargaining," "expertise," "a full and fair hearing"-were them-
selves indeterminate standards. There was no analytic reason 
they could not be applied in a functionalist, realist manner to 
pierce the external formalities of institutional legitimacy. In the 
collective bargaining context, for example, a determination of 
procedural legitimacy could consist of either the formal, external 
manifestation of bargaining-the fact that labor negotiators sat 
in a conference room together and spoke to each other-or it 
could extend to a functional evaluation of whether the substan-
tive proposals offered and rejected were reasonable or whether 
they manifested a true purpose to subvert the bargaining re-
quirement and the institution of labor/management self-deter-
mination. In the administrative review context, the principle of 
institutional settlement might be satisfied by the fact that "ex-
perts" with appropriate credentials decided a particular issue in 
the discourse of scientific jargon, or it could require a determina-
tion whether an administrative decision was truly "expert" or 
simply a substantive blunder. 
But process-theorists couldn't allow procedural legitimacy to 
turn on the content of a decision. The whole reason for the focus 
on process in the first place was the belief that there was no 
neutral method to evaluate substance. In order for process the-
ory to appear value-neutral, institutional legitimacy had to be 
identified in a way that respected the foundational distinction 
between process and substance, and therefore that stopped short 
of a functionalist review that required consideration of the sub-
stantive merits of institutional decisions in order to determine 
their procedural legitimacy. 
72. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 456-57 (1963); Peller, supra note 7, at 675. 
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Accordingly, the resolution of the rupture between the tradi-
tionalists and realists through the principle of institutional set-
tlement ultimately depended on limiting the reach of realism to 
the realm of substance and on utilizing the formalist method of 
the traditionalists in evaluating institutional legitimacy, so that 
questions of degree, value, and judgment would be kept out of 
the institutional analysis. The fifties scholars rescued the law/ 
politics distinction from the realist assault by simply transfer-
ring the traditionalist formalism from the level of substance to 
the level of procedure. The competence of a particular institu-
tion was identified through some external, objective criterion 
rather than through any functional analysis of whether the insti-
tution worked according to characteristics that made it legiti-
mate in the institutional competence grid. Thus, democracy was 
identified with the fact that people vote, rather than with any 
quality of the day-to-day "life in society or with the way that leg-
islatures resolved substantive issues. Federal judicial neutrality 
was associated with life tenure rather than with the content of 
particular judgments. Good faith bargaining was identified by 
the objective fact of labor and management negotiators meeting 
in a conference room rather than through consideration of the 
substantive offers made or rejected. And administrative legiti-
macy was identified by a determination that relevant issues had 
been considered rather than through a determination whether 
the actual agency decision was grounded in expertise or not. 
CONCLUSION 
It was no accident, then, that Wechsler posed the issues in 
Brown according to a pivotal dichotomy between the objective 
facts of a comparison of facilities and the subjective, individual 
reactions of women and blacks. Such a distinction between ob-
jectivity and subjectivity was merely the echo of the shared at-
tempt, continuous from Lochner to the fifties process-theorists, 
to distinguish an objective and determinate law from subjective 
politics. In the traditionalist ideology, subjectivity had been as-
sociated with the private market, and the key issue of legal 
thought was the identification and enforcement of the separa-
tion between public and private realms. The jurisprudential sig-
nificance of the process approach lay in showing that the disin-
tegration of belief in the public/private distinction, the 
centerpiece of the traditionalist image of the role of law, did not 
in and of itself entail the rejection of the notion of an imper-
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sonal and neutral authority under the rule of law. Instead, law 
could be made consistent with the substance of social welfare 
ideology by redefining the realms of subjectivity and objectivity 
according to the character of an assertion rather than a geo-
graphical division of social life. In the fifties, the subjectivity of 
a question became a justification for legislative resolution, rather 
than a reason for limiting the reach of public power. 
But the preservation of the rule of law simultaneously re-
quired a return to the same kind of formalism as the realists 
identified in traditionalist ideology. Just as the Neutral Princi-
ples article can be seen as motivated by a central opposition to 
the Lochner approach, it also simultaneously reproduced that 
methodology. Just as the Lochner Court interpreted the social 
power of the bargaining context as individual free choice, so 
Wechsler interpreted the social power of American racism as the 
subjective perception of its victims. Just as the Lochner Court 
legitimated the enforcement of contracts based on the presump-
tion of individual choice, so Wechsler legitimated the enforce-
ment of segregation as the presumed free choice of voters. And 
just as the Lochner Court associated the status quo of social re-
lations with economic liberty, so the fifties scholars associated 
democratic liberty with the . status quo of life in the United 
States. The fifties generation did not see that their legal ap-
proach depended on the same structure of formalism as the 
Lochner approach because, like the Lochner Justices, they con-
vinced themselves that the institutions of American life actually 
worked in practice the way that they worked in the models of 
their theory. And thus they constructed the conceptual catego-
ries of process theory such that the reality of social domination 
in American life would be irrelevant to the procedural analysis 
because it had been assumed away as a value question for the 
legislature, just as the reality of social power in the contracting 
process was assumed away in Lochner through a belief in the 
objective nature of the common-law distinctions between free 
will and duress, fraud and incompetency. Where the Lochner-
era lawyers tried to make the rule of law consistent with the lib-
eral assumption of the subjectivity of value through the assumed 
neutral framework of the economic marketplace, the mainstream 
lawyers in the fifties tried to make the rule of law consistent 
with the modernist premise of value relativism through the as-
sumed framework of the democratic marketplace. And just as 
the liberty of the economic realm was identified through the for-
mal externality of contractual consent, the rules of off er, accept-
ance, and formal consideration, so the liberty of the political 
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marketplace was identified in the fifties through the formal act 
of voting. The fifties writers, in short, made the essence of the 
rule of law the inability to identify social domination. 
There was nothing within the terms of the principle of institu-
tional settlement, nor in the general process theory analytic, that 
demanded that they be applied in the formalist and uncritical 
manner utilized by Wechsler and other fifties legal scholars. 
Simply given the analytics of institutional legitimacy, the proce-
dural matrix could have been conducted as a critique of the 
ways in which the actual workings of American legal institutions 
failed the tests as set forth by the fifties scholars, just as there 
was nothing within the traditionalist categories of public and 
private or free will and duress that demanded, as a matter of 
analytic necessity, that those concepts be applied in a way that 
legitimated rather than impugned economic relations at the turn 
of the century. 
But it would be a mistake, I think, to conclude that Wechsler 
and the other fifties scholars simply erred by lapsing into a for-
malist application of the institutional legitimacy calculus. The 
alternative was a functionalist, substantive review that would 
have required taking substantive positions on the issue of the 
distribution of social power. The process rhetoric was so appeal-
ing in the fifties precisely because it was capable of being ap-
plied formalistically, without regard to the actual conduct of so-
cial relations in American society. 
In short, there was nothing historically or analytically deter-
mined about the structure of the legal rhetoric that the fifties 
writers constructed. In terms of the intellectual context in which 
they found themselves, there were alternatives that included the 
possibility of continuing the realist and modernist critique of au-
thority or the possibility of pursuing an objective theory of so-
cial justice based on the primacy of the group and the commu-
nity. And in terms of the sense that the proceduralist paradigms 
were conceptually dictated by the particular conundrums of in-
tellectual debate in the thirties and forties, the fact of the mat-
ter is that the change in focus from substance to procedure did 
not, and could not, solve the analytic difficulties that motivated 
the fifties theorists because the very same issues reasserted 
themselves in any application of the process analytic. 
I have presented the intellectual context of the 1950's in order 
to show why the process-oriented legal framework seemed to the 
fifties writers to transcend the sense of rupture and opposition 
within intellectual and legal thought. But this context could not 
have dictated the direction that they took. Instead, the process 
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rhetoric reflected a social and political choice on the part of the 
fifties generation to repress the corrosive analytics of the realists 
in favor of a vision that would legitimate, rather than impugn, 
the legitimacy of American legal institutions. 
To be sure, there was something noble and inspiring in the 
rhetoric of Wechsler and the other process-theorists, in the im-
age of a commitment to the higher principles of the rule of law 
regardless of the outcome of particular cases. There was much 
that was progressive and egalitarian in the antielitist rhetoric 
through which Wechsler and other constitutional theorists 
placed the values of democratic self-determination above· the 
power of the Supreme Court. And in the context of the struggle 
with legal traditionalists, the creation of a rhetoric that could 
legitimate social welfare legislation against the claims of liberty 
of contract adherents was a progressive move. 
But the fifties approach simultaneously reflected an ethnocen-
trism that contradicted the pluralist and liberatory tone of the 
rhetoric. It was, ultimately, no great paradox that Wechsler and 
other northeastern intellectuals were joined in a coalition with 
racist Southerners in questioning the Court's legitimacy in 
Brown, because it was a precondition of finding persuasive the 
process-oriented descriptions of American life that one experi-
ence social life as basically free and democratic, rather than as 
marked by social domination and oppression. Despite its pro-
gressive and sophisticated tone, the process rhetoric was the lan-
guage through which socially comfortable and intellectually so-
phisticated white northeasterners translated their own social 
assumptions into language that was culturally acceptable in 
their environment because it did not bear the obvious baggage of 
bigotry. But Wechsler's assertions that blacks might simply 
"choose" to see racial segregation as inequality, that female "re-
sentment" of male-imposed gender segregation was irrelevant to 
the determination of inequality, and that the concentration 
camps in which Japanese-Americans were incarcerated in the 
forties might have been "a blessing to its victims, breaking down 
forever the ghettos in which they had previously lived,"73 were 
not marginal and accidental to his analytic argument about judi-
cial review. They were part and parcel of the apologetic vision of 
American society upon which the process approach rested. In 
contrast to the democratic and antielitist rhetoric of Wechsler's 
text, there was a subtext in which elitism reasserted itself in the 
73. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 27. 
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rejection of the interpretation of social events offered by those 
directly involved-by blacks, women, and Japanese-Americans. 
More than a jurisprudential or analytic project, the rhetoric 
that the fifties process-theorists created was the reflection of the 
way that a particular group in American culture came to terms 
with the disintegration of the old paradigms of social legitimacy. 
In this sense, process theory is more accurately understood as 
the cultural ideology through which mainstream, predominantly 
white, male, and economically secure American intellectuals in 
the post-War period filtered their perception of their social envi-
ronment. In the context of the thirties and forties, when the crit-
ical issue in law seemed to be the legal and ethical legitimacy of 
the social welfare state, the process resolution could appear plu-
ralist and inclusive. In later years, with the controversy over the 
Vietnam War, the process rhetoric would become more and 
more obviously partisan as American participation in the war 
was justified through the rhetoric of protecting a democracy that 
was identified, again, through the formal fact that people voted 
(often under the shadow of bayonets) rather than through any 
critical evaluation of the quality of life in South Vietnam. But 
the discourse about the Vietnam War only brought into wider 
view what was already contained within the process analytic in 
the 1950's, an unwillingness on the part of mainstream American 
intellectuals to identify social domination. 
Wechsler did not only help to complete the process-oriented 
work of fifties scholars. He also, simultaneously, helped to un-
dermine it. The Neutral Principles article exposed the politi-
cally conservative underbelly, as well as the intellectual contra-
dictions, of the fifties resolution. The process-oriented approach 
was presented as a reflection of a principled consensus about the 
basic legitimacy of American legal and political institutions. 
Wechsler's work suddenly brought to the forefront the funda-
mental conceptual weakness of the whole strategy: while process 
theory rested on the ability to differentiate in neutral, apolitical, 
and uncontroversial fashion between issues of institutional and 
procedural legitimacy and issues of substantive justice, Wechsler 
revealed the way that these questions were inextricably bound 
together, how substance could not be divorced from process. 
Wechsler's article revealed in stark form that when the process-
theorists were talking abstractly about the competence of the 
"legislature" resting upon its "democratic" or "representative" 
procedures, they had in mind the actual "legislatures" as they 
existed in the United States in the 1950's, in Topeka and Baton 
Rouge and Richmond and Washington. The Neutral Principles 
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article made clear that the "rule of law" that would symbolize 
the free world in the post-War era was perfectly consistent with 
broad-scale social domination. While the process rhetoric sur-
vives in our contemporary intellectual context, after Wechsler's 
work legal scholars could never again recover the generative 
sense that some transcending analytic structure would un-
problematically work out the contradictions that the realists 
exposed. 
We are still within the culture of this disintegration today. We 
are close enough to Wechsler's time to recognize the ideology 
that sees in the ideas of neutrality, free speech, fair procedures, 
and cultural tolerance the basis for a vision of freedom without 
the necessity of making substantive, political decisions about 
what is just or unjust. And we have witnessed enough recent his-
tory to know that this liberal and progressive rhetoric can 
quickly turn reactionary when its benign assumptions about so-
cial life are challenged. 
